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In 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration will open national airspace to unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS). Nonmilitary uses for UAS range from agriculture services to 
entertainment purposes, and include tasks as mundane as inspecting gutters and as 
consequential as fighting fires. 
Outside of the safety issues that accompany many breakthrough technologies, the 
effort to integrate UAS into national airspace is enmeshed in political, legal and 
economic policies that require careful navigation. Factors like cybersecurity and 
technological advancements will continue to influence the way UAS can be used.  
This thesis provides an orientation to the key considerations in UAS integration. 
Policy recommendations include early stakeholder engagement; a national data protection 
law; no-fly zones around private residences; clearly identifying UAS operators and 
owners; nonlethal payloads in national airspace; adapting current surveillance laws to 
UAS; a single, national privacy law to facilitate the free flow of commerce and 
coordination across state lines; a federal office in charge of monitoring data privacy; 
accountability of data collectors; limited exemptions for activities conducted in the 
interest of national security or to protect life and property; and managing cybersecurity 
risks. 
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 In 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will introduce rules that open 
up national airspace to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), also commonly called drones. 
Until 2012, when Congress included a mandate for this action in the FAA appropriations, 
UAS were primarily used by the military for training and for overseas support. The 
National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) has also been developing high-
altitude UAS. More recently, small UAS have been available to hobbyists, but they are 
not allowed to occupy the same airspace as manned aircraft.  
This looming deadline is a focal point for entrepreneurs and lobbyists, civil 
liberties advocates and lawmakers, as well as others who are following this topic. 
Unmanned vehicles offer enormous design flexibility since they are not constrained in 
size or structure by a requirement to carry a human operator. In addition to virtually 
unlimited airframe options, the sensor technology that UAS can carry is exceptionally 
advanced. These two factors alone open the way for a multitude of new, nonmilitary uses 
for UAS in areas that range from agriculture to emergency services to entertainment, to 
tasks as mundane as inspecting gutters or any other activity that might benefit from an 
aerial approach.  
Outside of the safety issues that accompany many breakthrough technologies, the 
effort to integrate UAS into national airspace is enmeshed in politics, legal issues, 
economics, and other issues that require careful navigation. There are also influencing 
factors like cybersecurity and technological advancements like autonomy, which will 
change the way UAS can be used.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis explores a range of vastly different, but interrelated issues that may 
impact the success of UAS integration, within the context of homeland security. A central 
question is “How might domestic civilian and government UAS use shape the homeland 
security environment?” Supporting questions that guide this research include: 
xiv 
 What are the potential uses for UAS in the homeland security context? 
What are the potential threats? 
 What types of UAS technology are available—and to whom? What is the 
current range of UAS capabilities? 
 How is the UAS issue being framed in public discussion? What is the 
potential impact of media and public opinion on UAS use for homeland 
security purposes? 
 Who are the influential stakeholders? What aspects of the debate do they 
influence? How are they connected? 
 What technologies and laws define privacy today? How do Americans 
understand privacy in the 21st century?  
 Are UAS a disruptive technology when used in the domestic airspace? 
C. METHOD 
The research methods included a qualitative analysis of the growing body of 
literature on UAS, as well as a policy options analysis. A range of literature was 
reviewed, including reports from the Government Accountability Office and the 
Congressional Research Service, congressional testimony, government websites and 
publications, industry and private sector research, civil liberties groups, domestic and 
foreign laws, media coverage and consultation with subject matter experts. Action 
research offered insight into the stakeholder environment.  
The final result is intended to be orientation to key issues and considerations in 
UAS integration for the nontechnical homeland security practitioner and other 
stakeholders.   
D. FINDINGS 
Although UAS have been in use since the early to mid-20th century, they may be 
a disruptive innovation as they enter the commercial market. In his book The Innovator’s 
Dilemma,1 Clayton Christensen describes a disruptive technology as one that may start as 
a niche market for just a few consumers—perhaps even something with less utility than 
the original version—but nevertheless a technology that rapidly overtakes the sustaining 
                                                 
1 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). 
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technology of the day. Examples include the switch from main frame to desk top 
computing, land lines to cell phones, and horses to automobiles. 
In the face of change on the scale of the pending introduction of UAS in national 
airspace—especially with so many unknowns— it is natural for people to resist change. 
In his book Thinking Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman 
explains this risk aversion through prospect theory.2  
“The brains of humans and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to 
give priority to bad news,” Kahneman says.  “Loss aversion is a powerful conservative 
force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and 
individuals. This conservatism helps keep us stable in our neighborhood, our marriage, 
and our job; it is the gravitational force that holds our life together near the reference 
point.”3 
Another theory that may help explain how the American population might react to 
the relatively sudden introduction of UAS is Georgetown professor Fathali Moghaddam’s 
Micro-Macro Rule of Change.4 Moghaddam, an author and expert in psychology and 
terrorism, explains that rapid changes at a macro, or societal level, may trigger a 
psychological disconnect at the micro, or individual, level.5 Coupled with prospect 
theory, the Macro-Micro rule of change might forecast a strong sense of angst and 
possibly social unrest as the American population acclimates to the relatively sudden 
introduction of UAS in 2015. 
E. KEY ISSUES 
While the FAA focuses on safety, there are several other issues that will influence 
the environment within which UAS integration is taking shape. These issues include 
rapid advances in technology, such as autonomous robotics (requiring no human 
                                                 
2 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux): 283–286, 305. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 130. 
5 Ibid. 
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guidance), increasingly precise sensor technology that can consume vast amounts of data, 
the lack of consistent laws to protect privacy, and rapidly growing cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities.  
F. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT  
The complex stakeholder environment creates its own set of tensions. A diverse 
mix of industry lobbyists, civil liberties advocates, researchers and students, media, 
emergency responders and congressional interests all carry their own agendas into the 
discussion. Figure 1 provides a high-level illustration of these interrelationships.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Map of Stakeholders with an Interest in UAS in American 





In an era of increasing transparency and increasing access to massive amounts of 
data, concerns over persistent surveillance and privacy create another layer within the 
UAS integration debate. Compounding these is a growing understanding of just how 
vulnerable technology across the board is to cyber-attacks.  
 
 
Figure 2. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities during UAS Production 
 
 
H. LEGAL ISSUES 
The concept of privacy is exceptionally subjective. Americans in particular are 
notoriously protective of their privacy, while at the same time highly reliant on mobile 
phones, GPS, Internet communications, credit cards and other technology that tracks our 
every move. At present, the laws governing privacy are an amalgam of federal, state and 
local laws that have been created to address specific issues- often as new technology is 
introduced, as shown in Figure 3. However, there is no single, nationally applicable 
privacy law—not even the commonly referenced 4th Amendment covers the issues that 
arise in the UAS debate. In contrast, the European Union—and in particular the United 
Kingdom where CCTV is commonly used for law enforcement—have developed 




Figure 3. Timeline of Privacy in America6 
                                                 
6 Photos, Prezi.com, accessed January 12, 2014.  https://prezi.com/. 
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Landmark legislation includes Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, EU Directive 95, and the Safe Harbor Initiative. More recently, the 2012 Data 
Protection Reform Act was introduced to update EU Directive 95. Notable points in this 
initiative include: 
 A single set of data protection rules valid across the EU 
 Increased responsibility and accountability for those processing personal 
data   
 A “right to be forgotten” to help people better manage data-protection 
risks online  
I. ANALYSIS 
While the issues vary greatly, all of the topics discussed in this thesis are 
connected and should be addressed comprehensively. In the context of UAS integration, 
cybersecurity impacts privacy, safety and economic interests. Legal issues touch all of 
these areas, and yet laws struggle to keep pace with technology.   
Given the broad range of stakeholder agendas related to UAS integration, it will 
be important to engage media, advocacy groups, Congress, industry, academia, 
emergency responders and all of the other stakeholders in a transparent policy 
development process.  
J. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Building on the work already conducted by a variety of interest groups on both sides of 
the issue, this thesis offers 10 policy recommendations: 
 Establish boundaries, including no-fly zones around private residences, to 
protect privacy 
 Encourage accountability by clearly identifying UAS operators and 
owners, such as through a UAS version of the Department of Motor 
Vehicles  
 Engage stakeholders early and often at all levels; let the market drive 
demand, especially for emergency and homeland security activities 
 Employ only nonlethal payloads in national airspace 
 Adapt current surveillance laws to UAS 
xx 
 Develop a single, national privacy standard to facilitate the free flow of 
commerce and coordination across state lines 
 Establish a federal office in charge of monitoring data privacy, with state-
based field offices  to streamline oversight of data collection, aggregation 
and disposal 
 Enforce accountability of data collectors, holding them responsible for the 
protection and disposal of personally identifiable information 
 Provide limited exemptions for activities conducted in the interest of 
national security, life safety, and protection of property, such as surveying 
pre- and post-disaster damage 
 Manage risk and enforce cybersecurity at all levels, in partnership with the 
private and public sectors 
K. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The deadline to integrate UAS into national airspace is almost here. Will this 
initiative be successful? Will government or the private sector drive UAS integration 
forward—or both? Efforts to put thoughtful policies in place today will have economic, 
security, and privacy impacts that reach well into the future. Poorly developed policy- or 
no policy at all- could steer the future toward an era of increased surveillance and 
diminishing security. An attempt to back out of the global UAS market could leave the 
U.S. at a severe economic disadvantage in a growing, multi-billion dollar industry. In the 
best case, excellent policies will be developed in close collaboration with the many 
stakeholder groups, resulting in new job opportunities, better and cheaper airborne 
services, increased safety and security and a system that is well adapted to serve human 
needs, rather than one that imposes itself on the population.  
Future research opportunities abound, as this area develops. Some areas for 
consideration include emerging technology like autonomy and 3-D printing, and how 
these technologies will impact UAS safety and accountability; cybersecurity issues and 
UAS integration; or additional public opinion surveys. 
Just as engineer/inventor/artist Leonardo Da Vinci faced seemingly 
insurmountable challenges on the political and social fronts, current proponents of UAS 
integration must work against a natural predisposition to the status quo to gather 
widespread support for a technology that will bring about rapid, macro-level change. 
xxi 
Whether one believes that today’s population is better prepared to adapt, having 
been primed by a world that is already technologically advanced, or that technology is 
advancing too fast to keep up, the policies we put in place and decisions taken today will 








No undertaking as daunting as completing a rigorous master’s degree while 
holding a full-time job can be accomplished solo. This thesis was possible only with the 
help of the following:  
 My brilliant husband, who persuaded me to take this journey and shared 
many a conversation over 4 a.m. coffee; who has borne more than his fair 
share of the responsibility for our home; and who has single-handedly kept 
our lives on track for the past 18 months, yet never stopped encouraging 
me along the way.  
 My professors at the Center for Homeland Security and Defense, who re-
awakened my long-dormant curiosity and reinvigorated my intellect, and 
who persistently gave of themselves and their vast experience. 
 My thesis advisor John Rollins and reader Robert Simeral, who gave me 
free reign to experiment and gently nudged me back on track when I 
followed too many interesting rabbit trails. 
 My cohort, who never stopped challenging me and who have collectively 
made me a better person. I will miss our discussions more than you know. 
 My parents, who gave me a love of flight, who taught me to read the 
clouds and to love the smell of small airports.  
 
My deepest gratitude to you all. 
xxiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes 
turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to 
return. 
—Artist, engineer and innovator Leonardo da Vinci 
 
The U.S. is on the brink of a new era in aviation, one that has the potential to 
impact nearly every aspect of how Americans move goods, protect critical infrastructure, 
respond to emergencies, and monitor environmental issues. In 2015, the Federal Aviation 
Administration is scheduled to release guidelines that open up domestic airspace to 
widespread use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), a technology that is virtually 
unlimited in its potential uses since the size and structure does not need to accommodate 
a human pilot. With the advent of widespread UAS use in a nonmilitary capacity, a new 
industry will emerge, requiring new laws, new technology and new training.1  
Significant change over a short period of time can create societal breakthroughs 
or, if implemented thoughtlessly, the potential benefits could be buried under public 
backlash or even lead to undesired consequences. Given the significance of opening up 
national airspace to UAS for government and commercial purpose, it is important that 
policy makers come together with stakeholders to create a clear vision and a strategic 
path to the desired end state.  
The environment within which these developments are unfolding is dynamic, 
exciting and filled with potential. Machines are getting smarter, faster and more 
connected. Economic opportunities are beckoning, and the wheels of innovation are 
spinning up new ways to improve our lives. But there are also perils: cybersecurity, loss 
of privacy and safety among them.  
                                                 
1  Teal Group, “Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $89 Billion in Its 2012 UAV 
Market Profile and Forecast,” news release, April 11, 2012. http://tealgroup.com/index.php/about-teal-
group-corporation/press-releases/66-teal-group-predicts-worldwide-uav-market-will-total-89-billion-in-its-
2012-uav-market-profile-and-forecast. Aerospace industry analyst Teal Group released a 2012 study 
forecasting annual expenditures to double over the next 10 years, for a total of $89 billion in global 
expenditures—nearly double the current rate of expenditures—with the U.S. leading research and 
development at 62% of the market, and accounting for 55% of acquisitions.  
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At the time this thesis was being researched, Edward Snowden’s leaks about 
National Security Agency surveillance exploded in the news, as did coverage of U.S. 
military drone strikes overseas. These issues cannot help but color the discussion of 
introducing UAS at home. 
A. PROBLEM SPACE  
The introduction of UAS in the domestic airspace is a complex and polarizing 
issue. This thesis will attempt to unravel some of the key questions lingering in the minds 
of stakeholders ranging from advocates to lawmakers, and develop a realistic picture of 
the environment and possible paths forward.  
Looking at the just the nontechnical aspects, there are at least six critical issues at 
play: 
 Privacy: The U.S. population is uniquely protective of its privacy 
compared to other democratic nations like the U.K., which regularly uses 
CCTV for surveillance in public spaces. Implicit protections for individual 
privacy are embedded in the U.S. Constitution through the 4th 
Amendment.   
 Legal Structure: There is no single, overarching privacy law that can be 
applied nationwide; instead there is a hodge-podge of federal, state and 
local laws that can vary significantly 
 Accelerating Technology: Technology is advancing far faster than a 
bureaucracy can pass sensible laws to manage the new technology.  
 Economics: As other countries start to adopt UAS domestically for 
various purposes, the U.S. may be left at a competitive disadvantage in a 
growing industry worth potentially tens of billions of dollars- or more.   
 Public Perception: The media is casting an increasingly critical eye on 
U.S. military targeted strikes overseas, and Congress has held special 
hearings on the issue. Key concerns bubbling up include the lack of public 
discussion on the use of UAS, dehumanizing war and general ethics of 
remote killing. Domestically, many opponents equate UAS with military 
drones, making it difficult to separate the issues for domestic and 
commercial use. 
 Cybersecurity: Concurrent with, but not directly related to, the rise of 
UAS is a growing awareness of the inherent vulnerabilities in technology 
that relies on the Internet although not a widespread issue at present, it is 
possible for UAS sensors and guidance systems to be hacked. In fact, in 
2012, Iran hijacked a U.S. RQ-170 drone, claiming to have used GPS 
3 
spoofing to safely land and secure it. If foreign press can be believed, 
there are concerns in Pakistan that terrorist organizations are attempting to 
gain the technical expertise to conduct similar attacks on drones used to 
patrol Pakistani borders.2 
As a disruptive technology, domestic UAS are igniting public debate over 
important issues like civil liberties and safety. They are also inspiring new markets and 
innovative approaches to old problems, such as how to tackle “dull, dirty and dangerous” 
jobs like monitoring thousands of miles of natural gas pipelines or large agriculture 
enterprises. 
While the FAA is working on how best to integrate UAS safely into an already 
crowded airspace, federal policies may not be able to keep pace with the civil liberty 
issues that may arise with a boom in the use of UAS and the highly advanced sensors that 
they can carry. So how do we balance legitimate homeland security needs with market 
pressures and the interests of an open society?  
At present, UAS may be operated legally on an extremely limited basis, and only 
if a Certificate of Authorization (CoA) can be obtained from the FAA. In January 2014, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) awarded CoAs to the first six test sites 
nationwide. While small UAS are available commercially, they are commonly limited to 
low-flying toys for hobbyists, such as quadcopters. 
1. Developing Supporting Policy  
Foreseeing a world in which UAS are as commonplace as refrigerators, a number 
of organizations have started to draft proposed guidance to address civil liberties and 
privacy issues. These organizations range from the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), to the ACLU and Privacy Now, to state and local lawmakers. However, 
there is not yet a single, nationwide policy in place. 
Successful integration of UAS into domestic airspace will require attention to 
safety and civil liberties. It will also need to take into account economic drivers, 
emerging cybersecurity issues, the advancement of autonomy, and public opinion.  
                                                 




2. Growing Market Competition  
Delaying the 2015 congressional deadline could put the U.S at a significant 
competitive disadvantage in a booming global UAS technology market. Currently, over 
70 allied nations and a number of nonallied nations are actively exploring or even using 
UAS at home.3 Figure 1 shows the countries that acquired UAS technology as of 2011. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Countries that Acquired UAS by December 2011.4 
 
                                                 
3 U.S. Air Force. United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047. 
(Washington, DC: USAF Headquarters, May 18, 2009); Teal Group, “Group Predicts.”  
4 Thomas Melito, Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End Use 
Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports. GAO -12-536 (Washington, DC: GAO Government 
Accountability Office, 2012), 10.  
5 
3. A Matter of Public Opinion 
At least one recent public opinion survey found that the general population would 
accept commercial and humanitarian use of UAS,5 although a growing number of states 
and local municipalities such as Charlottesville, VA, and Seattle, WA, have taken pre-
emptive steps to prevent law enforcement use of UAS.6  
However, bad press could work against the UAS industry, slowing down 
integration or even killing the effort altogether if there is enough pushback from the 
public, as in the case of the now-defunct DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
National Applications Office.   The concept behind this program was sound enough, in 
that it was an attempt to create a cost-saving approach to developing a Department-wide 
capability for gathering detailed imagery through satellites and other platforms. This 
imagery could have been used in legitimate homeland security missions, such as disaster 
support. However, lacking a strong public outreach component, the program could not 
get past public misconceptions and fears that this effort would lead to illegal surveillance 
on American citizens and invasion of privacy. Instead, individual components have had 
to explore various options on their own, without the economies (and savings to tax 
payers) that an integrated, Department-wide initiative could have brought.    
Countering the potential drag of negative public opinion, commercial interests are 
pushing UAS integration forward as the consumer demand rises. There is a rapidly 
growing underground market as companies from across the spectrum of the private sector 
are picking up on tremendous opportunities that UAS can offer.7  
The general public is already becoming accustomed to low-altitude “toy” UAS 
such as Verizon’s “Parrot” quadcopter that can be controlled through a mobile device, 
and small UAS are featured in a 2014 Lexus commercial, drawing an association with 
                                                 
5 Joe Eyerman et al., Unmanned Aircraft and the Human Element: Public Perceptions and First 
Responder Concerns (Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2013), 2–6. 
6 Somini Sengupta. “Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives Efforts to Limit Police Use,” New York Times, 
February 15, 2013. 
7 Chris Francescani,  “From Hollywood to Kansas, Drones Are Flying under the Radar,” Reuters, 
March 3, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-usa-drones-domestic-
idUSBRE92206M20130303. 
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high tech luxury. Driven by commercial and private use, it is a relatively small step for 
public acceptance of much broader market uses, including homeland security and law 
enforcement use. Allowing the market to drive demand may ultimately benefit law 
enforcement and emergency services, if the public creates the demand for UAS rather 
than having UAS forced on them.8   
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A new world is emerging, one in which unmanned systems will take their place 
alongside human operators in the sky, on land and in the sea. Unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) in particular are on the verge of crossing over into the mainstream. 
Since 2012, the FAA has been preparing to enact regulations that allow UAS to 
be used domestically by 2015.  
This thesis will examine domestic UAS use as a disruptive technology with far-
reaching homeland security impacts. In particular how might domestic civilian and 
government UAS use shape the homeland security environment?  
Supporting questions include: 
 What are the potential uses for UAS in the homeland security context? 
What are the potential threats? 
 What types of UAS technology are available- and to whom? What is the 
current range of UAS capabilities? 
 How is the UAS issue being framed in public discussion? What is the 
potential impact of media and public opinion on UAS use for homeland 
security purposes? 
 Who are the influential stakeholders? What aspects of the debate do they 
influence? How are they connected? 
 
                                                 
8 There is also a role for standards organizations like the ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel to 
develop consistent guidelines that will support interoperability of various UAS communications systems, as 
well as the adoption of UAS in a safe and publicly acceptable manner. Developing interoperable 
communications will increase safety efforts by enabling manned flights to communicate with UAS 
operators. It would also significantly increase joint law enforcement and homeland security efforts, 
allowing greater real-time information sharing, as encouraged in numerous strategies, including Vision 
2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise. 
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 What technologies and laws define privacy today? How do Americans 
understand privacy in the 21st century?  
 Are UAS a disruptive technology when used in the domestic airspace? 
C. METHOD  
1. Qualitative Analysis  
A qualitative analysis of current literature will help identify and explore 
nontechnical issues associated with UAS integration into national airspace, with the 
homeland security practitioner in mind. Due to the extensive impact of the issue across a 
wide variety of stakeholders, action research will supplement the literature review as a 
way to develop a stakeholder engagement angle of a policy options analysis, suggesting 
paths that the U.S. might take to ensure a balanced approach to meeting homeland 
security and market demands as UAS are integrated in to national airspace. 
Since UAS are still very new in national airspace, further research will include a 
review of related literature on recent and emerging technologies that have also raised 
civil liberties, such as CCTV use in the European Union and the United Kingdom. These 
regions have democratic values similar to those of the U.S., allowing relevant 
comparisons to be drawn between their approaches to privacy issues when using CCTV.   
2. Policy Options Analysis 
Policy options will be developed based on promising practices identified in the 
literature review, as well as by aggregating and synthesizing proposed rules offered by 
advocacy groups and legislators. Proposed criteria for measuring policy outcomes could 
include: 
 Policy keeps pace with market demands. The United States enjoys a 
free market economy that is protected by laws, even within the arena of 
homeland security. If policies are not developed with this in mind, then the 
market will find alternate routes to meet consumer demand.  
 Public interest is considered, as expressed through political 
leadership. Public interest will be assumed to coincide with political 
acceptability, since lawmakers are expected to be the voice of their voters. 
A policy that is highly inflammatory to voters (and therefore likely to hurt 
a political career) is unlikely to succeed.  
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 Media coverage is positive or neutral. The media is a key gatekeeper of 
information and the ways in which media frame an issue can significantly 
influence popular opinion. Optimally, media support will help build public 
support for the policy. At a minimum, neutral media coverage will not 
hinder policy implementation. 
 Fundamental values are protected. The balance between Constitutional 
rights, inherent national values and homeland security should be 
maintained in the development of new policies. It may be worth 
establishing a benchmark to define these values and avoid a slippery slope.   
Sample: The sample used for this research includes literature produced by the 
UAS industry, key interest groups on both sides of the issue, Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) reports, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, think tank 
publications and media coverage. It also includes key privacy laws. 
Scope: The wealth of possible domestic use for UAS is incredibly broad, 
spanning nearly every aspect of government, commercial and private use. For the purpose 
of this thesis, and in keeping with the emergent nature of this issue, the scope will include 
a handful of diverse, but connected issues of which homeland security practitioners and 
decision makers should be aware. 
Data Sources: A wide net will be cast to ensure a comprehensive and balanced 
inquiry into the subject of this thesis. Data sources will include a literature review, 
subject matter expert consultation, media coverage and legislative milestones to illustrate 
key aspects of the debate. Further detail is provided below: 
Literature Review: The literature review will cover issues related to privacy, the 
global market for UAS, UAS technology, disruptive technology and the psychological 
impacts of macro-level change. 
 Primary sources: Laws, regulations, congressional testimony, House and 
Senate bills, Department of Defense long-term strategies, and sample state 
and local legislation.   
 Secondary sources: Congressional Research Service reports, Government 
Accountability Office reports, industry and advocacy literature, journal 
articles and videos, websites and think tank publications.  
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Subject Matter Experts: Experts including government officials from across the 
Department of Homeland; professional researchers, think tank experts, and possibly 
private industry experts may be consulted for background research. If available, 
unstructured conversations may also include representatives of the leading industry and 
activist groups. 
Output: An initial look into the subject yields a complex blend of politics, 
economic interests, media influence, an evolving definition of privacy, and technological 
impacts. While the much of the paper offer recommendations on how to address the 
privacy issue, it is anticipated that the research will also provide a more complete 
understanding of the environment within which the debate over UAS integration is being 
conducted.  
The final product may be considered an orientation to UAS for the nontechnical 
homeland security practitioner and other interested parties. Through this analysis, it is 
hoped that readers ranging from policy makers and journalists to students and interested 
citizens can better understand the influential factors and key considerations in domestic 
UAS use as they make their own decisions on efforts in this area.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is a rapidly growing body of literature on the introduction of UAS in the 
U.S. This work includes Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, congressional hearings, news coverage, theses, and 
industry and advocacy publications. There is also draft state legislation on UAS use for 
surveillance, as well as the less formal, but more passionate, online discussion created by 
readers of mainstream news articles.  
Within this literature, there are strong currents of pro-industry advocacy, as an 
emerging global market worth billions of dollars dangles almost within reach. There is 
also a thread of unease communicated by those who foresee the potential for civil 
liberties abuses or even a future where autonomous UAS take their place in the “Internet 
of Things,” making potentially lethal decisions without human oversight.  
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1. Who Uses UAS? 
Like many widely used technologies such as cell phones, GPS and the Internet, 
UAS originated with the military. Although the military is still the primary customer, the 
appetite for adapting UAS capability to domestic use has grown rapidly in both the public 
and commercial sectors, already outpacing legal considerations. Aerospace companies 
are anticipating new growth markets and a handful of colleges are already creating degree 
programs for UAS operators.9  Law enforcement agencies want to use UAS to monitor 
and fight crime; homeland security agencies like Customs and Border Protection have 
already started using UAS on a limited basis to conduct border patrols, search and rescue 
missions and even support firefighting. There is also vast potential for commercial use, 
ranging from monitoring gas pipelines and other critical infrastructure, to film-making, 
agriculture and cargo. In fact, some modern barnstormers like Team BlackSheep have 
already started using small UAS to film global landmarks, and at least one enterprising 
REALTOR® uses UAS to film high-end property for marketing purposes.10 . 
2. Military Use 
Drones have become increasingly common overseas since the Vietnam War, 
especially in “dull, dirty and dangerous”11  situations like extended surveillance or 
conducting highly targeted missions in enemy territory.12 Current Department of Defense 
strategic plans focus on expanding UAS capability across all branches. One development 
since December 2012 has been the Navy’s tests of aircraft carrier catapult launch and 
                                                 
9 Isolde Rafter, “Anticipating Domestic Boom, Colleges Rev up Drone Piloting Programs,” 
NBCNews.com. January 29, 2013. 
10 Rise of the Machines. Journeyman TV, online documentary, produced by Mark Corcoran and Janet 
.E Silver, October 15, 2012, http://www.journeyman.tv/?lid=64311.  
11 Bart W. Darnell, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Logical Choice for Homeland Security Support,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
12 Robert G. Moose, “Covering The Homeland: National Guard Unmanned Aircraft Systems Support 
for Wildland Firefighting and Natural Disaster Events” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
Although the Department of Defense primarily focuses its efforts outside national boundaries, through 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities, the military (commonly through the National Guard) may provide 
support within the U.S.—for example, during catastrophic disasters like Hurricane Sandy in 2012. (At least 
one thesis, “Covering the Homeland: National Guard Unmanned Aircraft Systems Support for Wildland 
Firefighting and Natural Disaster Events” proposed equipping the National Guard with UAS to support all 
hazards response.) 
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arrested recovery of an X-47B UCAS-D13 — a dangerous maneuver for any aircraft, on a 
relatively short, moving runway.   
In 2007, the Department of Defense issued a 25-year joint Unmanned Systems 
Roadmap which covers air, ground and maritime systems. The Roadmap notes that 
positive media coverage of the use of unmanned systems for humanitarian and scientific 
work will ease privacy concerns and that “[s]ocietal acceptance typically leads to market 
growth, which stimulates R&D that can lead to more capable, less costly unmanned 
systems for defense.”14   
In 2009, the U.S. Air Force issued a 50-year implementation strategy. The United 
States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047 cites “persistence, 
endurance, efficiency and connectivity” as reasons why UAS have become increasingly 
in demand across the joint forces. Along with increased capability, the Flight Plan 
envisions a grand scheme to “harness increasingly automated, modular, globally 
connected, and sustainable multi-mission unmanned systems.”15  There is also is a focus 
on presenting career paths to “build a foundation for the development of officer and 
enlisted aircrew with UAS experience.”16   
A year after the release of the Air Force strategy, the Army released its own 25-
year plan, the U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010–2035.17 This 
document looks at current gaps and future requirements that evolve from protecting 
ground forces and conducting surveillance to medical evacuations and ferrying cargo.   
While these documents offer a nod to privacy concerns, they are primarily 
concerned with technical issues, such as interoperability across branches, identifying 
                                                 
13 U.S. Navy. “X-47B Operates Aboard Theodore Roosevelt,” news release, November 10, 2013, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=77580.  
14 Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007–2032 (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2007), 62. 
15 U.S. Air Force. United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047 
(Washington, DC: USAF Headquarters, May 18, 2009), 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 U.S. Army. U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010–2035 (Fort Rucker, AL: U.S. 
Army Center of Excellence, 2010). 
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future requirements, testing new models for different uses, and planning for future 
technology integration.   
3. Law Enforcement 
To a much lesser extent, local law enforcement agencies have started 
experimenting with UAS. Some of these efforts—such as in Seattle—were halted to 
allow lawmakers to catch up with the technology. Anticipating a surge in law 
enforcement uses, the International Chiefs of Police (IACP) Aviation Committee 
published a concise three-page guide for law enforcement use of UAS in August 2012. 
Although short, the guide touches on critical issues ranging from public engagement to 
technical recommendations.18 
4. Other Government Agencies 
In addition to its own high-altitude UAS research, NASA is holding an 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airspace Operations Challenge to encourage the 
development of safety related UAS technology, such as sense and avoid and lost 
communications link systems.19  Also, as noted earlier, Customs and Border Protection 
acquired several large UAS to assist with border patrols and other efforts in support of 
emergency services.   
Figure 2 provides a relatively current snapshot of the possible uses of UAS in 
national airspace, although it does not include hobbyist and other nonsanctioned UAS, 
nor is it updated to include the UAS test sites.  
Figure 3 shows a sample of the variety of sizes and shapes that a UAS can take, 
ranging from a device that can fit in the palm of one’s had to high-altitude airframes with 
a wingspan close to 100 feet. 
 
 
                                                 
18 “Recommended Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft,” International Association of Chiefs 
of Police Aviation Committee, accessed August 16, 2013. 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP_UAGuidelines.pdf. 
19 “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airspace Operations Challenge (UAS AOC),” NASA, accessed 




Figure 2.   Examples of Current Uses for UAS and their Altitudes of Operation..26  
                                                 
26 Gerald L. Dillingham, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into 
the National Airspace System, GAO-12-981(Washington, DC: GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2012), 6. 
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Figure 3.  Sample of Unmanned Systems27 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ieee_pilot/articles/96jproc12/jproc-RWeibel-
2006118/article.html 
                                                 
27 Aleksandra L. Mozdzanowski et al., “Feedback Model of Air Transportation System Change: Implementation Challenges for Aviation Information 




Figure 4.  NonFederal Recipients of Certificates of Waiver or Authorization and Special Airworthiness 
Certificates in the Experimental Category and the Location, as of July 13, 2012.28 
                                                 




Figure 5.   Selected UAS Test Site Operators29 
                                                 
29 “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Infographic,” Federal Aviation Administration, accessed January 2, 2014. 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/infographic/. 
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5. Opportunity, Controversy and the Great Unknown 
UAS proponents have strong support through the Congressional Unmanned 
Systems Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives. From the industry perspective, the 
nation is on the verge of a new era in aviation. The industry voice is represented through 
The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), a global 
advocacy network with 2,500 member organizations representing 7,000 members from 
government industry and academia across 55 allied countries. This group strives for 
broad adoption of UAS across society. 
However, there are a number of issues driving the debate over UAS use, led by 
civil liberties and safety concerns. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the 
Human Rights Watch are two leading voices of dissent, warning of the negative potential 
of widespread UAS use, rather than actual usage. (Of note, neither organization 
advocates that UAS be abolished, rather, they advocate for cautious implementation, 
public and congressional oversight and nonlethal use.)  
Anticipating a surge in UAS use to fight crime, the ACLU and other civil liberties 
advocates base their opposition on the possibility that unmanned aircraft in national 
airspace could launch the nation into an era in which the government increasingly 
invades individuals’ privacy to collect data on the noncriminal activities of ordinary 
Americans.30   
a. Accelerating Technology  
Although not a new technology, UAS in the domestic airspace are a disruptive 
technology. Clayton Christensen, who coined the term in his book The Innovator’s 
Dilemma, describes how well-established industries can be disrupted when they focus on 
sustaining existing ways of doing business through incremental change. A disruptive 
technology is one that may only have a niche market to begin with, may be cheaper and 
                                                 
30 “Domestic Drones,” American Civil Liberties Union Blog of Rights, accessed February 3, 2013. 
https://www.aclu.org/blog.To prevent a “surveillance society” from developing, the ACLU has drafted 
recommended guidance, which is integrated in recommendations at the end of this thesis. 
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have limited utility, but which rapidly and radically changes the market, ultimately 
leaving the traditional competitor in the dust.31  
Technology is advancing far faster than a bureaucracy can pass sensible laws to 
manage the consequences. In addition to civil liberties issues that must be addressed, 
basic safety concerns can be compounded as technology rapidly outpaces the 
government’s ability to regulate it. There are even psychological consequences of a rapid 
change, when changes on a macro level are taking place faster than humans can adapt 
psychologically.32  
b. Autonomy 
Anyone with a Roomba vacuum cleaner or an automatic pool vacuum is already 
familiar with autonomous robots. At present, UAS are actually fairly large systems 
requiring a support team, composed of an operator and often a larger crew to support 
communications and maintenance, depending on the size and purpose of the UAS. 
However, autonomous capability is being developed for UAS, which will eventually 
allow pre-programmed UAS to conduct activities without a human operator monitoring 
and guiding the vehicle from another location. This could be very useful in particularly 
dull jobs, such as monitoring pipelines or surveying crops.33 
Foreseeing the development of completely autonomous UAS in the near future, in 
its report, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, the Human Rights Watch 
calls for an internationally binding law that would make it illegal to arm an autonomous 
UAS (a UAS that is programmed with certain parameters and then set free to conduct its 
activity without human decision makers’ input.)  
Daniel Suarez, author of “Kill Decision,” also makes a compelling case against 
autonomous armed robots in the 2013 Ted Talks discussion, “The Kill Decision 
                                                 
31 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). 
32 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006, 130. 
33 Even in the case of fully automated unmanned vehicles, a human being must enter the parameters at 
the outset. In essence, a UAS is simply an extension of the operator and his or her intent, and accountability 
could follow suit. 
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Shouldn’t Belong to a Robot.” He draws comparisons between feudal society and the 
evolution of the military and democracy, then links evolving technologies used for 
mapping out social connections with the potential for anonymous war. To avoid a 
dystopian future, he joins the Human Rights Watch call for an international treaty to 
make autonomous armed robots illegal. As a way to enforce accountability, Saurez 
suggests that “Each robot and drone should have a cryptographically signed I.D. burned 
in at the factory that can be used to track its movement through public spaces... And 
every citizen should be able to download an app that shows the population of drones and 
autonomous vehicles moving through public spaces around them.”34 
Civil liberties activists are concerned that dictators may use UAS against their 
own citizens.35 They are also concerned about the “dehumanization” of weapons systems, 
claiming that a human being is more likely to show compassion and therefore less likely 
to kill. The Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups fear that as UAS 
become more and more autonomous, it will become easier to kill in circumstances where 
a normal human might hesitate. This line of thinking is illustrated in the Lucifer Effect, in 
which Stanford professor Phillip Zimbardo makes the case that de-personalizing a human 
makes it easier to do things that an ordinary person would never do under normal 
circumstances. In the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment conducted by Zimbardo in 
1971 and later experiments, as well as during an examination of the prison abuses at Abu 
Ghraib, Zimbardo found that separating someone from their victim, whether through 
masks, distance or other depersonalizing techniques, also reduces inhibitions in such a 
way that an individual finds it easier to conduct illegal, violent or otherwise extremely 
anti-social behavior.36 In his discussion on the “mechanisms of moral disengagement,” 
Zimbardo says “we can minimize our sense of a direct link between our actions and its 
harmful outcomes by diffusing or displacing personal responsibility.”37 Civil rights 
                                                 
34 Daniel Suarez, “The Kill Decision Shouldn’t Belong to a Robot,” Ted Talks, posted June 2013. 
http://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_suarez_the_kill_decision_shouldn_t_belong_to_a_robot.html. 
35 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots. (New York: Human 
Rights Program Watch, November 19, 2012). 
36 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: 
Random House, 2008), 298–301, 324–325.  
37 Ibid., 311. 
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activists are concerned that the distance and technological barriers between UAS 
operators and other humans could make it easier to use lethal force, if UAS are armed. 
Conversely, in the NBCnews.com article, Anticipating domestic boom, colleges 
rev up drone piloting programs, Texas A&M computer science student Brittany Duncan 
suggests that a remote pilot is more likely to take more time to determine the threat 
before shooting, since they are not immediately threatened. (Duncan, a licensed pilot, is 
studying robot-human relations to see how robots might help disaster survivors.)38  
c. Sensor Technology 
A UAS is essentially a flying platform that can be equipped with a range of 
equipment, including highly sensitive cameras that can collect very detailed information 
from wide swaths of area—very useful in geographical surveys, for instance, but 
potentially also capturing information that the UAS operator was not seeking.   
The September 2012 GAO report, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Measuring 
Progress and Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into 
the National Airspace System, notes privacy as an emerging concern as sensor technology 
is increasingly capable of collecting massive amounts of data.39 A Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report also released in 2012, Drones in Domestic Surveillance 
Operations Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses, observes that 
advanced sensor technology will also draw a focus to law enforcement issues like 
curtilage and open fields—two legal measures of private and public space—as UAS and 
their sensor payloads provide ever more defined insight into back yards and even into 
buildings.40 .  
                                                 
38 Rafter, “Anticipating Domestic Boom.” 
39 Dillingham, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 32–36. 
40 Richard M. Thompson, Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment 
Implications and Legislative Responses, CRS Report R42701(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013, 7, 16. 
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d. Privacy 
The U.S. population is uniquely protective of its privacy compared to other 
democratic nations like the U.K., which regularly uses CCTV for surveillance in public 
spaces. Implicit protections for individual privacy are embedded in the U.S. Constitution 
through the 4th Amendment.   
The ACLU and other civil liberties advocates believe that unmanned aircraft in 
civil airspace could launch the nation into an era in which domestic surveillance 
increasingly captures the noncriminal activities of Americans.41 To prevent the U.S. from 
sliding into a “surveillance society,” the ACLU has drafted recommended guidance in 
Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of 
Drone Aircraft.42 Key concepts from this report are integrated in recommendations at the 
end of this paper.   
e. Legal Frameworks 
The privacy issue is complicated. There is no single, overarching privacy law that 
can be applied nationwide; instead there is a hodge-podge of federal, state and local laws 
that can vary significantly. Many people point to the 4th Amendment as the source of a 
“right to privacy.” However, this protection is not explicit, nor does it address modern 
technology: the Fourth Amendment was established after the American Revolution to 
protect Americans from “unreasonable search and seizure” and requires probable cause 
and a warrant. It states very briefly:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.43 
                                                 
41  Jay Stanley Crump and Catherine Crump. Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance. 
(Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Union, 2011), 1. 
42 Crump, Protecting Privacy, 15–16. 
43 United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights, accessed January 11, 2014, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html. 
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Other federal laws include the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 
2002. The Privacy Act limits government collection and use of personal information in 
public records, while Section 208 of the E-Government Act adds a requirement for 
agencies to conduct Privacy Impact Assessments prior to collecting personally 
identifiable information like names, contact information, and social security numbers..44 
Specifically, Section 208 states that the intent is to “ensure sufficient protections for the 
privacy of personal information as agencies implement citizen-centered electronic 
Government.”45 
Notably, neither of these laws provides general protection from surveillance in 
public spaces, such as might be conducted by traffic cameras, police aircraft, 
neighborhood drive-bys or other law enforcement activities to monitor criminal activity.   
f. Safety 
While not the primary focus of this thesis, it is worth commenting on the safety 
issues that must be considered when integrating UAS into domestic air space. Air traffic 
is strictly controlled by FAA regulations; pilots must file a flight plan before travelling, 
and must stay in contact with air traffic control in the event that course adjustments must 
be made. However, there are no established regulations for unmanned flight; moreover, 
unmanned aircraft systems (which include the remote operator) have potential 
vulnerabilities that are still being explored. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 
published a white paper in April 2011 stating its position that “no UAS should be allowed 
unrestricted access to public airspace unless it meets all the high standards currently 
required for every other airspace user.”46 After the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
drone was flown into the sea off the California coast in January 2014, ALPA again 
voiced its concerns over the need to prioritize safety as UAS integration moves forward. 
                                                 
44 Dillingham, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 34. 
45 Electronic Privacy Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, 116 Stat. 2899. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ347/pdf/PLAW-107publ347.pdf . 
46Air Line Pilots Association, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Challenges for Operating Safely in the 
National Airspace System, White paper (Washington, DC: Air Line Pilots Association, 2012).  
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In the February 2013 WFAA news article, Arlington police hopeful their drones 
will soon be taking flight, some commercial pilots expressed their lack confidence in the 
current level of “see and avoid” technology, and fear that UAS pose a safety risk to 
manned aircraft- especially if the operator loses communication with the UAS.47 
However, “sense and avoid” technology is under development be several agencies, 
including NASA. 
g. Market Competition 
Although UAS have been in use since at least the early part of the 20th century, 
they could be considered a disruptive technology within the context of national airspace. 
Harvard professor and author Clayton Christensen coined the term, which he describes in 
The Innovators Dilemma. Essentially, a disruptive technology is something that starts 
with a niche market, with simpler, lower cost solutions, and then quickly displaces more 
expensive traditional technologies. Examples include the introduction of the Model T 
Ford, desktop computers and cell phones.   
The appetite for adapting UAS capability to domestic use has grown rapidly in 
both the public and commercial sectors, already outpacing legal considerations. The 
potential cost savings of UAS is inviting to strapped law enforcement agencies that want 
to use UAS to monitor and fight crime; homeland security agencies like Customs and 
Border Protection have already started using UAS on a limited basis to patrol large, and 
largely unpopulated, U.S. borders, conduct search and rescue missions and even assist 
firefighting. There is also vast potential for commercial use, ranging from monitoring gas 
pipelines and other critical infrastructure, to film-making, agriculture and cargo.   
UAS proponents have strong support through the 50-member, bipartisan 
Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus—although the Caucus appears to be primarily 
interested in promoting UAS for military and defense use. From the industry perspective, 
the nation is on the verge of a new era in aviation. Aerospace companies are anticipating 
new growth markets and an NBCNews.com article, Anticipating domestic boom, colleges 
                                                 
47 Monica Diaz, “Arlington Police Hopeful Their Drones Will Soon Be Taking Flight,” WFAA News, 
February 7, 2013, http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/tarrant/Arlington-police-hopeful-their-drones-will-
soon-be-taking-flight-190325001.html. 
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rev up drone piloting programs, discusses why a handful of colleges are already creating 
degree programs for UAS operators.48    
h. Cybersecurity 
Concurrent with the rise of UAS is a growing awareness of the inherent 
vulnerabilities in technology that relies on the Internet although not widespread at 
present, it is possible for UAS sensors and guidance systems to be hacked, as in the case 
of the RQ-170 drone that was captured in Iran. 
6. Summary 
Since beginning this research, additional literature has been generated at an 
exponential rate, especially in the press. Current events such as targeted drone strikes on 
U.S. citizens overseas, the Edward Snowden leads on National Security Agency 
surveillance, and FBI use of drones in America have raised public concerns and a greater 
demand for public discussion on the issue. Congress is scrambling to draft legislation to 
address privacy issues, and universities are scrambling to put together courses on “drone 
journalism” and UAS operation. Yet, the technology and the global markets for it are 
evolving so quickly that any attempt to legislate it seems to lag ever further behind. 
In an attempt to mitigate concerns like these, the UAS industry itself has proposed 
what it calls “common sense” guidelines for the growing international community of 
UAS researchers and users. These guidelines are posted on the organization website, 
http://www.auvsi.org/conduct, and rest on the core principles of “safety, professionalism 
and respect”49  
A growing number of other organizations have also contributed proposals for 
UAS policies as well, notably privacy and civil liberties advocates. As UAS integration 
takes a more prominent place in public discussion, this thesis will attempt to orient 
                                                 
48 Rafter, “Anticipating Domestic Boom.” 
49 “Unmanned Aircraft System Operations Industry ‘Code of Conduct,’ ” Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International, accessed February 2, 2013. http://www.auvsi.org/conduct. 
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homeland security practitioners and interested observers to some of the key issues that 
should be considered.  
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Although there are a number of intriguing challenges rising out of the UAS 
debate, the privacy issue seems to be the biggest and most difficult to wrangle into place. 
Safety issues have a fairly clear line of ownership back to the FAA, but no single entity 
“owns” the privacy issue.50  However, privacy issues leave their mark across technology, 
law, and that most nebulous and unpredictable of all things: human emotions.  
With privacy as the context, the following chapters provide an introduction to 
some key considerations for homeland security practitioners or emergency managers who 
are considering UAS as a means to augment their capabilities.    
 These start with a discussion of how people react to change and risk, to 
provide a foundational understanding of how the U.S. population might 
react to UAS integration. 
 The next chapter is an orientation to the political-economic landscape of 
stakeholder groups and their potential interests in the issue, all of which 
should be considered as a jurisdiction plans how and when to introduce 
UAS to its community.  
 A chapter on cybersecurity touches on an emerging issue that will impact 
privacy and security as UAS become more common in a nonmilitary role. 
 The social and legal framework for privacy and civil liberties are 
addressed at length in the following chapter, including a look at how the 
United Kingdom and European Union approach privacy issues and 
technology.   
 The thesis concludes with thoughts on future considerations, along with 
analysis and recommendations drawn from the various organizations that 
have started to develop proposals for addressing privacy.  
  
                                                 
50 The lack of ownership and accountability of widely used resources, such as the Internet, is also 
described as the Tragedy of the Commons.  
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II. RADICAL CHANGE, RISK AVERSION AND THE TRIUMPH 
OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Although UAS have been used by the military since the early part of the 20th 
century for training and, more recently, surveillance, until very recently they have been 
separated from mainstream America physically and cognitively. Now, with the advent of 
domestic use for UAS, the public is faced with a change that some might compare to the 
introduction of the automobile in the early 1900s,51 in that mainstream America may very 
well see a radical technological evolution in a very short amount of time. While some 
early adopters eagerly embraced the horseless carriage, the newspapers of the period have 
numerous articles expressing public outrage over these dangerous, nuisance-y machines.   
With the introduction of UAS, many more unknowns enter into the mix than 
during the introduction of the automobile, notably thanks to the ability of UAS to go 
almost anywhere and their ability to carry equipment that can capture large amounts of 
highly detailed visual data. The issue is also greatly confused by the growing public 
awareness of military drone usage, along with the media coverage of alleged NSA 
surveillance.  
Even as press started increasing its scrutiny of NSA spying and military drones in 
the interest of public debate, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos announced his plans to test small 
UAS for commercial delivery.52 Weeks later, on December 30, 2013, the FAA 
announced six competitively selected UAS test sites around the U.S., as required in the 
FY 2012 FAA appropriations act. These two announcements spurred a flurry of media 
stories anticipating technological evolution along with growth opportunities for industry 
and employment. In a curious juxtaposition to relatively neutral or positive mainstream 
media coverage, online discussion following these articles was quite negative. 
                                                 
51 Peter Singer, “The Predator Comes Home: A Primer on Domestic Drones, Their Huge Business 
Opportunities, and Their Deep Political, Moral and Legal Challenges,” Brookings Institute, March 8, 2013. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/03.08-drones-singer. 
52 Manjoo Farhad, “Why Bezos’s Drone Is More Than a Joke,” Wall Street Journal, last modified 
December 5, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579238312058025896. 
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For example, the commentary following a December 30, 2013, CBS news 
article53 offers overwhelmingly negative opinions, often referencing dystopian movies 
like Terminator or Robocop. One comment from “JamesBrains” states: 
I’d be okay with this if I could trust the government and big business. Of 
course, I can’t. All it takes is a bomb here or there in the U.S., and all of a 
sudden, every branch of the federal government is fine with drones spying 
on every [expletive] American (if they aren’t already). (December 30, 
2013 7:7PM) 
Interspersed with rare comments take a positive stance on the issue, other 
messages respond with threats to capture or shoot down any drones that fly over their 
property. This comment by “ToddWest” is captures typical concerns expressed in online 
conversations about government or corporate usage: 
@wstcstmsgrthe IRS or anyone else starts flying devices over my property 
and keeping the a/v on file to build a dossier on me I will take it as acts of 
war against me....the government is a massive criminal organization, I am 
not interested in the benefits of kneeling down to such a beast. (December 
30, 2013 1:1PM) 
Are these just random ravings, or do they accurately capture public sentiment? 
According to at least two studies,54  the public would generally be in favor of using UAS 
for emergency management or homeland security. However, those same studies also 
indicated a relatively low awareness of UAS overall, meaning that a large portion of the 
population is undecided and potentially could be persuaded in either direction. With the 
media magnifying both the pros and cons of UAS integration, how might public opinion 
be swayed?  
To understand how people react to the prospect of massive change on the scale of 
what America faces now, two theories can provide context: prospect theory, as discussed 
in Daniel Kahneman’s book Thinking Fast and Slow, and the Macro-Micro Rule of 
                                                 
53 “FAA Announces Drone Testing in Six States,” Associated Press, December 30, 2013. 
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Change, introduced by Georgetown professor Fathali M. Moghaddam in From the 
Terrorists’ Point of View. 
A. PROSPECT THEORY (RISK AVERSION) 
If one can assume that opening up national airspace to UAS is something of a 
gamble— in other words, there is no way to know where this technology will take the 
U.S. over time—then prospect theory offers a solid framework for understanding 
potential public reaction to such uncertainty.  
Kahneman won a Nobel Prize in economic sciences in 2002 for demonstrating 
that people are inherently biased toward risk aversion when making decisions with 
uncertain outcomes. According to prospect theory,55 most people prefer to keep what 
they know rather than risk losing something they have- even if there a greater likelihood 
of attaining an even greater benefit if they take the risk. Kahneman also discusses how 
negativity dominance can impact decision making, claiming that this is a survival 
mechanism. 
 “The brains of humans and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to 
give priority to bad news,” says Khaneman.  “Loss aversion is a powerful conservative 
force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and 
individuals. This conservatism helps keep us stable in our neighborhood, our marriage, 
and our job; it is the gravitational force that holds our life together near the reference 
point.”56  
1. Micro-Macro Rule of Change 
It is also possible to apply Fathali Moghaddam’s Micro-Macro Rule of Change to 
the integration of UAS in domestic airspace. Moghaddam, an expert in psychology and 
terrorism, explains that there is a deep psychological disconnect between the rate of 
change at a macro, or political-economic level, and the micro level of individual. In other 
words, a change introduced relatively quickly on a society-wide basis may take a much 
                                                 
55 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), 283–286.  
56 Ibid., 305. 
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longer time to absorb on an individual basis as individuals have to adjust to dramatically 
new circumstances. If this rule were applied to the introduction of UAS, then it could be 
assumed that the U.S. population would need time to acclimate themselves 
psychologically to dramatic new changes that could come with UAS use.  
2. Easing the Transition 
In a 2013 survey of more than 2,000 U.S. residents nationwide, the Institute for 
Homeland Security Solutions found that the 44 percent of respondents reported little or 
no prior awareness of domestic uses for UAS. However, over half of respondents 
supported the use of UAS for protecting life and property as well as for commercial use. 
Key concerns included possible monitoring, safety and the government’s ability to 
regulate UAS. All of these concerns scored very high, in the 65–75 percentile.57  These 
concerns and the large percentage of undecided opinion could indicate an opportunity to 
move public opinion for or against UAS. Active, ongoing public engagement is key to 
fostering public acceptance of domestic UAS. This is discussed in the next chapter.  
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III. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Communications professionals understand that in the absence of information, 
people will fill in the blanks with their own version of the truth. With such a diverse 
collection of entities and coalitions actively shaping the environment within which the 
UAS debate is growing, it is important for all who are considering UAS to understand 
how differing agendas can influence the picture.  
Figure 6 offers a high-level snapshot of the various interest groups and factors 
that influence their motives. As can be seen in the graphic, the stakeholder landscape is 
fairly complex and nuanced. Some stakeholder groups, such as the federal government, 
must answer to groups with greatly varying agendas. Figure 7 shows the geographical 
spread of congressional interest in UAS, as well as the six FAA-approved test sites. Of 
interest, while there is significant geographical spread, there are also wide stretches of the 
country with no representation and no test site. Without further research it is difficult to 
assign a level of significance, but it may indicate sections of the country with 
comparatively little awareness of the coming UAS integration. 
 
. 
Figure 6.  Conceptual Map of Stakeholders with an Interest in UAS in American 




Figure 7.  Map of Congressional Representation on Senate and House UAS 
Caucuses, Overlaid with the Six FAA-Approved UAS Test Sites as of 
December 31, 2013. 
A. STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 
1. Federal 
Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus (U.S. House of Representatives:  
Co-chaired by Buck McKeon (CA-25) and Henry Cuellar (TX-28), this 50-member 
committee was formed explicitly to promote the use of UAS. Its mission is “educate 
members of Congress and the public on the strategic, tactical, and scientific value of 
unmanned systems; actively support further development and acquisition of more 
systems, and to more effectively engage the civilian aviation community on unmanned 
system use and safety.”58  
                                                 
58 “Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus,” Unmanned Systems Caucus, accessed January 14, 
2014. http://unmannedsystemscaucus.mckeon.house.gov/about/purpose-mission-goals.shtml. 
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Senate Unmanned Aerial Systems Caucus: This 8-member committee was 
formed in 2012 to work on the privacy and other issues related to UAS.59 It has no 
website and as yet there is little information on the caucus beyond what was available in a 
press release. However, its presence indicates a growing awareness and interest in the 
issue on the other side of Congress. 
Department of Homeland Security: The Department’s mission includes 
“preventing terrorism and enhancing security; managing our borders; administering 
immigration laws; securing cyberspace; and ensuring disaster resilience.”60 Interest in 
UAS might include support for monitoring the nation’s extensive borders to disaster 
damage assessments or search and rescue.  
Federal Aviation Administration: The FAA received a congressional mandate 
in the FY 2012 appropriations to develop rules that would allow UAS to fly in domestic 
airspace by 2015. Its mission is to “provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in 
the world.”61 The FAA’s primary interest in UAS will be focused on safety issues. 
National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA): NASA is 
developing high-altitude UAS for scientific exploration, and they have issued a private 
sector challenge to find solutions to technical issues related to safety, such as improved 
sense and avoid technology. 
2. State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) 
Homeland security and emergency management offices:  All levels of 
government will need to understand the possibilities and issues related to UAS, as they 
determine whether to spend diminishing funds on acquiring these systems.  
                                                 
59 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “New Senate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Caucus to Tackle Privacy Issues,” 
National Defense Magazine,  December 2012, 
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60 “Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed January 2, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/mission. 
61 “Mission,” Federal Aviation Administration, accessed January 2, 2014, 
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First responders: Law enforcement, fire and other emergency responders may 
have a strong interest in UAS technology as economically viable way to bolster teams 
that are already spread thin.  
3. Commercial 
Aviation: The aviation industry faces significant disruption with the advent of 
UAS. New technology may be needed to operate manned and unmanned aircraft safely in 
the same space. UAS technology can also be integrated into traditional aircraft to 
improve safety and reliability of human-piloted airplanes. 
Agriculture industry: UAS equipped with the right sensors can monitor and help 
manage water and pest conditions, saving water and crops. 
Critical infrastructure owners and operators: The nation relies on tens of 
thousands of miles of electrical transmission lines, gas pipelines, and other critical 
infrastructure that is often located in remote areas. UAS could offer cost effective ways to 
monitor, repair or protect this infrastructure.  
Defense industrial base: Large corporations that have traditionally developed 
aerospace products for the Department of Defense may be interested in developing new 
markets at home, as budgets for foreign wars are scaled back. 
Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs will find opportunities to exploit the potential of 
UAS in creative ways. 
Entertainment: Hollywood, sporting events and paparazzi are all potential 
customers, as UAS offer new ways to get close to the action.  
Shipping companies: With Amazon the first to set its flag in the sand, other 





Media: As the traditional public watch dog and as a business interest, the media 
will be interested in any stories about UAS that will sell readership/viewership. However, 
the media is also a critical information channel and should be engaged early and often to 
help educate the public and facilitate a public dialogue on the issue.  
Activists: Civil liberties groups, privacy advocates, environmental groups and 
other public interest organizations will be concerned with potential negative 
consequences of UAS integration.  
Pilots: Traditional pilots may feel threatened by the potential loss of aviation 
careers. They may also be concerned about safety issues related to communicating with 
and flying near UAS. According to a Bloomberg news article on the January 2014 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Predator crash off the coast of California, the Air 
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) called for the FAA to reconsider its timeline for UAS 
integration in order to give safety issues and regulations more time to be resolved.  (CBP 
grounded its remaining fleet of nine drones- at least until the cause of the mechanical 
failure could be determined.)62  
Individuals: Homeowners and other individual citizens may approach the UAS 
from any number of perspectives, ranging from “not over my back yard,” to “how soon 
can I get a UAS to augment my home security system.”  
5. Academia 
Scientific and engineering communities: The scientific and engineering 
communities will have the challenge of overcoming safety issues related to UAS and 
supporting the resolution of privacy and cybersecurity concerns. They will also play a 
key role in  research and development as UAS applications evolve. 
Academic and research institutions: Higher education institutions are already 
started to develop curricula for UAS pilots and UAS journalism. Research institutions 
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straddle science and academia and will be important partners in UAS testing and 
development.     
6. Illegal and Gray Areas 
Drug runners, terrorists and other illicit enterprises: Often entrepreneurial 
themselves, drug runners are already using UAS to transfer products across borders. 
Terrorists are another form of entrepreneur, who might leverage UAS for surveillance 
and carrying cargo or might simply hack into legitimate UAS for nefarious purposes. 
Paparazzi: Without firm legal guidelines, UAS offer paparazzi new ways to 
intrude on celebrities private lives.  
B. SUMMARY  
Stakeholder engagement plays a key role in successfully implementing change, 
and no less so in the area of UAS integration.  
The IEEE, whose “core purpose is to foster technological innovation and 
excellence for the benefit of humanity,” published a comprehensive technical paper in 
2008, discussing change models for implementing new technology in national airspace, 
including UAS. The paper stressed the importance of stakeholder feedback as a part of 
the process and provided a diagram (Figure 8) that shows the role of stakeholder 
engagement and feedback in the change process.63 
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Figure 8.  Change Dynamics Process Model.64  
There is enormous political and market pressure by a coalition of global industry 
and congressional members pushing to integrate UAS into commercial and civil use. A 
widely cited study by the Teal Group65 estimates the potential global industry to be worth 
$85 billion by 2020. It is easy to see why. Not only does language in the FAA’s FY 2012 
appropriations support widespread use of UAS for nonmilitary applications in the U.S. by 
September 2015,66 but the economic accessibility of UAS is also likely to appeal to local 
law enforcement and emergency responders across tens of thousands of U.S.  
In spite of this optimism, the prospect of American skies filled with drones raises 
alarms with civil liberties advocates who fear a pervasive intrusion by government into 
the lives of law-abiding citizens. First responders, on the other hand, might claim that 
UAS are simply a more economical platform for sensors that are already in use—and, in 
a way, they could be compared to airborne stoplight cameras. Regardless, the political 
tension surrounding the pending integration combined with negative media coverage of 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
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military drone strikes, Snowden and the NSA makes it all the more important that key 
issues are addressed promptly. Failure to do so could be catastrophic to the nascent 
domestic market. 
In the face of these overwhelming and often opposing tensions, policy makers and 
the media must share the significant burden of establishing a strong, positive vision for 
where we, as a nation, want to go with UAS integration. Stakeholder engagement will be 
fundamental to shedding light on areas of concern and identifying an acceptable path 
forward. 
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IV. CONVERGING PATHS: CYBERSECURITY, UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS AND THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY 
Cybersecurity is an emerging issue that impacts every aspect of electronic life, 
from financial and other infrastructure networks, to online privacy and identify fraud. In 
his book, America the Vulnerable, Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, 
Crime and Warfare, former National Security Agency senior counsel Joel Brenner 
discusses the digital footprints that Americans create through GPS in their cars and smart 
phones, debit and credit card transactions, retail customer savings cards, social media and 
just about every other modern convenience—possibly soon to include UAS.  
Many of these tools are now connecting with each other, creating an “Internet of 
Things” in which objects interact more efficiently with each other than with human 
operators.  “We can’t keep up with our own machines,” Brenner writes. “so our machines 
have begun to talk to one another, making decisions for us, exchanging information about 
us” and doing everything from applying brakes to landing aircraft.   
Moreover, as personal data proliferates and technology evolves exponentially,67 
Brenner laments “the law is chasing reality, not shaping it.”68  
This greater connectivity can also mean increased vulnerability, as attacks on one 
system can spread throughout the network. Not only can advertisers profile potential 
customers in great detail—thanks to software that connects the dots on all of our 
transactions—but organized crime, nonstate criminals, hackers, terrorists and foreign 
intelligence can just as easily exploit a myriad of weaknesses for their own means. 
As a case in point, in June 2013, University of Texas at Austin professor Todd 
Humphreys took control of a UAS through a technique called GPS spoofing. Once he had 
control of the vehicle, he was able to divert it from its original course without raising any 
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alerts in the machinery or the authorized controller—again, similar to the tactic used by 
Iran in 2012.  
Fortunately, Humphreys and the graduate students who assisted him were part of 
a team invited by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to test GPS spoofing on 
UAS in a controlled environment- in this case, on a type of UAS that is currently being 
marketed to law enforcement agencies. Humphreys had proposed the test to DHS as a 
way to identify and address potential security risks well before the FAA opens domestic 
airspace to commercial and civilian UAS in 2015.   
Shortly after the experiment, on July 19, 2013, Humphreys testified before the 
House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the House 
Committee on Homeland Security. The hearing, called “Using Unmanned Aerial Systems 
within the Homeland: Security Game Changer?” drew on the expertise of witnesses 
ranging from law enforcement to privacy advocates and technical experts. In his written 
statement, Humphreys discussed the crucial difference between military GPS, which is 
secured and encrypted, and civilian GPS, which was designed to be open and accessible. 
The latter is highly susceptible to sabotage, and moreover, it is embedded into almost 
every mobile technology we use in daily life, from automobiles to commercial airlines to 
boats to mobile phones. 
The vulnerability of civil UAS to GPS spoofing is but one expression of a 
more fundamental problem: the insecurity of civil GPS signals. If a UAS 
can be hijacked by GPS spoofing, what else could go wrong within our 
GPS-dependent national infrastructure?69 
Humphreys’ questions refers to everything from transportation to communications 
to banking and finance to energy distribution infrastructure In the context of 
commercialized UAS, cybersecurity vulnerabilities threatens more than privacy; 
consequences of cyber-attacks can range from potentially massive economic losses from 
corporate espionage to hacking and sabotage through UAS networks and guidance 
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systems. According to Brenner, corporations—especially those specializing in industrial 
design, advanced technology (e.g., UAS) and pharmaceuticals- are increasingly targets of 
foreign and corporate espionage. Since the private sector produces UAS, along with most 
other products the country relies on already, UAS customers have to rely on the private 
sector vendors to maintain the integrity of the system.  
Figure 9 shows a simplified concept of key points in the production timeline and 
corresponding cybersecurity threats, which is explained in more detail in the following 
section. 
 
Figure 9.   Cybersecurity Issues During UAS Production 
Starting with the research and development process, corporate espionage and 
insider threats are among the top vulnerabilities. Other insider threats can be attributed to 
a critical lack of cyber awareness, disruption by disgruntled employees or even laziness 
on the part of employee or even top management—for example, moving a thumb drive 
from a personal computer to a business computer can open a company up to cyber 
exploitation. 
The production cycle also offers numerous opportunities for sabotage. In Wired 
for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, Brookings Institute 
Senior Fellow Peter Singer notes that “With the huge amount of ‘civilian off the shelf’ 
technologies used in military robotics, these trends actually create a massive dependence 
on foreign manufacturers to supply America’s next generation of weapons. This 
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dependence has many worried “that foreign-made parts expose us to industrial espionage 
and cybersecurity threats.”70  
Although the focus of this research is on UAS in national airspace, rather than 
weaponized military drones, it can be assumed that the same market and supply chain 
issues would apply to commercially available UAS- if not more so. The efficiency and 
cost effectiveness of a global supply chain has created a world in which few, if any, 
vehicles (air, land or sea) are produced entirely within the U.S. While a UAS might be 
assembled in the U.S., the software, operating systems, sensors, and other physical 
components have likely been parsed out to vendors across the globe, including key 
“frenemies” and trading partners like China.  
While China is not aggressively pursuing cyber-attacks on the military, it is 
dedicating considerable resources toward stealing industry technology and intellectual 
property. The key motive? Simply to ascend as a global economic power that can 
compete effectively with the U.S. and other first world countries.  “China’s motivation in 
this area is not mysterious,” says Adam Segal in his Foreign Affairs article, “Chinese 
Computer Games: Keeping Safe in Cyberspace.” “The government desperately wants its 
economy to move up the value chain, to become a source of innovation rather than just a 
producer of cheap goods.”71 
Once a UAS has moved into use, GPS spoofing becomes a growing concern. 
Moreover, moving back to the focus on privacy, hackers can potentially access data 
streams such as video and voice communications.72    
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A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES IN SOLVING 
CYBERSECURITY THREATS 
Is the cyber threat significant enough that America should reconsider introducing 
UAS at home? While the threats are real, most of them lie in the realm of “possibility.” 
Humphreys’ test of GPS spoofing was conducted in a controlled environment with a 
highly skilled team. Lacking that level of expertise, Humphreys claims that widespread 
civilian GPS spoofing is “years away.” Meanwhile, market competition is working. 
Corporations seeking to protect their future market are already advertising more secure 
data and GPS systems, and even alternatives to GPS, in industry publications like the 
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International’s member magazine, 
Unmanned Systems. 
However, there is a question of whether industry will take a bare minimum 
approach to cybersecurity, or take a proactive stand. This is where, as Brenner notes, the 
customer base must leverage its buying power to demand higher standards of security at 
every weak point in the production and supply chain. 
To overcome cyber threats to privacy and security in commercial UAS, there will 
need to be a collaborative effort between the public and private sectors. Together, federal 
government and private sector stakeholders must develop or select security standards for 
each of the known major vulnerabilities noted earlier, and then the government will need 
to provide regulatory oversight and leverage its buying power to force compliance.  
On the federal side, this will need to include clear authorities and dedicated 
federal oversight. Although the FAA is tasked with creating the guidelines for integrating 
UAS safely into domestic airspace, the agency is reluctant to deal with issues it considers 
outside its domain, including security and privacy. While some people have 
recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take on these issues, 
DHS may be reluctant to take a lead role in what is likely to be a highly complex and 
contentious issue.   
Several witnesses at the July 2013 hearing on “Using Unmanned Aerial Systems 
in the Homeland: Security Game Changer?” pointed to DHS as best suited to the task. 
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William R. McDaniel, Chief Deputy, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, Conroe, TX, 
points out:  
Now that UAS technology is here, the FAA does not have the experience 
in its application. The FAA does not have the law enforcement, fire, or 
emergency management background to be able to relate to the mission of 
these agencies… we believe they have no real understanding regarding the 
“critical mission” aspect of UAS operations. If UAS operations remain 
under the oversight and control of the FAA, as is currently staffers do the 
case, domestic UAS operations will continue to be severely hampered or 
limited to the point of being useless.73 
 McDaniel proposes that the DHS Office of State and Local Law Enforcement 
take the lead, while fellow witness Amie Stepanovich, Association Litigation Counsel for 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), argued that the DHS Office of Privacy 
take the lead.  
On the other hand, U.S. Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), Chairman of the 
House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management referenced a GAO 
recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) to “examine the security implications of future, 
nonmilitary UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any actions deemed 
appropriate.74 
So where should the responsibility lie? Assuming that DHS should take the lead, 
several offices will have a stake in the issue, including those noted in the hearing as well 
as some that have not been mentioned, such as the cybersecurity office. The GAO’s 
recommendation to hand the lead to TSA may have the greatest merit due to the subject; 
however, TSA may not have the clout needed to gather a coalition of support from across 
the Department and other interested agencies. Because of the highly political nature of 
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this issue, it may be best for a DHS headquarters office such as the Office of Policy to 
take the lead, with an eventual transition to TSA. Another option would be to give the 
role to the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, which also resides at headquarters 
and plays an active role in addressing the broad spectrum of threats to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  
True cybersecurity will require a coalition of the informed and willing, bringing 
together private developers, customers, trade and industry associations, advocacy groups, 
and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial partners. Together, this coalition will need to 
work through the wicked problems stemming securing the cyber front while retaining a 
transparent, open democracy.  
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V. THE LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES OF 
PRIVACY 
Numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.   
—Justice Louis Brandeis, 1891 
Americans paradoxically combine an unquenchable curiosity with an 
insistence on being left alone.  
—Scientific American, September 5, 2008 
Privacy is a nebulous concept has perplexed lawmakers, human rights advocates 
and commercial enterprises alike. Much like light itself, which is simultaneously a 
particle and a wave, the notion of privacy can be measured in discrete, measurable units 
while also existing on a continuous scale where measurement is supremely subjective. 
In the U.S., the issue takes on an additional relevance. Founded by pioneers and 
born out of revolution, the U.S. clings to a strong heritage of individualism that sets it 
apart from most of its democratic allies. Suspicion of the government is woven into the 
fabric of the U.S. Constitution, with language that specifically prohibits government 
intrusion into the life of the individual.  
As technology permeates every aspect of modern life, privacy issues provoke 
debate in professions ranging from advertising to intelligence. Businesses want as much 
information as they can get on prospective customers, the better to target their services to 
likely consumers. The government seeks ways to document and track people ranging 
from entitlement recipients to criminals—whether to improve services and avoid fraud, or 
to keep a community safe. For the sake of convenience, ordinary citizens willingly leave 
a trail of their personal activities through commonly used technology ranging from GPS 
mapping, to online purchases, to value cards.   
While each of these activities can seem inconsequential in themselves, questions 
about privacy hinge on a handful of key issues, starting with how one even defines 
privacy. In fact, depending on one’s perspective, the age of privacy might even be over, 
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as Facebook founder Mark Zuckerman suggested in 2010,75 or it may retain such 
importance that a state or local jurisdiction takes pre-emptive measures to outlaw new 
technologies like UAS before they have even been introduced locally.  
Figure 10 provides a modest demonstration of how technology and privacy laws 
have evolved together since the American Revolution. While the focus is on the United 
States, key European Union policies discussed later in this chapter are included for 
context. 
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Figure 10.  Timeline of Privacy in America76  
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In her 2013 thesis, “Minding the Gap: The Growing Divide between Privacy and 
Surveillance Technology,” Debra Kirby provides an in depth examination of the nature of 
privacy and the laws that impact it, grouping privacy broadly under “conceptual” and 
“legal” frameworks. As Kirby points out, privacy encompasses intangible concepts, such 
as cultural and psychological norms. On the other hand, the many attempts to define 
privacy in a legal context have led to an assortment of incompatible federal and state laws 
that entwine courts, businesses and citizens in a maze bureaucracy and loopholes.   
The U.S. has not yet established a national law governing data collection and 
privacy, leaving such issues to the nation’s 56 states and territories. Some might argue 
that this is a legitimate free-market approach. Commerce thrives on the ability to target 
potential consumers with ever increasing accuracy, allowing companies to focus their 
marketing dollars where they are most likely to reap some benefits.  
Apart from Kirby’s study, other literature suggests that more tangible issues 
include who has access to personal data, how it is aggregated and used, how it is 
transmitted to third parties and ultimately how it is stored or destroyed. Combined, these 
issues can make it close to impossible to retain anonymity. The “right to be forgotten” or 
what Justice Brandeis called a “right to have a personality”77 is rapidly succumbing to a 
barrage of technological marvels that provide security, comfort and ease. These same 
technological marvels are increasingly connected and communicating with each other in 
the Internet of things that spans the globe, allowing the humans that they serve to 
relinquish more and more control over routine tasks like monitoring supplies or 
maintaining a safe distance from the car ahead. 
Even as regulators and policy makers scramble to catch up with technology 
introduced in just the past few years, dramatic new advances are carrying society forward 
in a technological tidal wave. As government bureaucracies at all levels struggle to keep 
pace with technological developments, they fall further behind the curve. Yet, in many 
respects, the increasing intrusion into personal lives is nothing more than an aggravation 
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that is part and parcel of a global trend toward increased transparency in all areas of life 
and government. In this interconnected, programmable world, the domestic UAS may 
emerge as a potential lightning rod for the debate over privacy. 
A. THE EU AND UK APPROACH 
Since there is no direct precedent for widespread commercial and domestic 
government UAS use, an analogy might be found in how the European Union (EU)—and 
the United Kingdom in particular—has addressed privacy issues related to pervasive use 
of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor public safety and security issues. The EU 
and its member countries provide a good sounding board for how such issues might be 
handled in the United States, which was largely a derivative of European law and culture 
when the nation was established. As a conglomerate of self-governing democratic 
nations, the EU as a structure loosely resembles the U.S. structure as a single entity 
comprised of many self-governing states and territories, with tens of thousands of semi-
independent local jurisdictions. Although the EU is not a federation like the U.S., it does 
provide overarching laws that supersede national legislation in some areas of policy.  
A key difference between the two regions is that European nations have dealt 
directly with terrorism on national soil for far longer than has the U.S., allowing 
European populations more time to adjust to a level of government surveillance that 
Americans might find intrusive. A factor that could complicate direct comparisons in 
approaches to privacy is that the U.S. has a fundamental distrust of federal government, 
an attitude born out of revolt against heavy handed colonial rule and safeguards written 
into its constitution. For the most part, EU member countries seem to have transitioned 
more gently away from authoritarian monarchies to shared power with voters (with key 
exceptions like France, which experienced a violent revolution inspired by America’s 
successful bid for freedom). 
Landmark doctrine includes the 1950 Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, specifically Article 8 on the 
right to respect for private and family life. Other foundational legal guidelines include the 
United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act of 1995 and the related Directive 95/46/EC of the 
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European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data.  
Guidelines for CCTV use have been developed out of these earlier efforts to deal 
with the growth of electronic data related to individuals since the Internet was introduced 
to the public. 
1. Privacy, Transparency and Surveillance  
Secrecy is to government what privacy is to persons. They both rise or fall 
—at present they’re falling—on the same technological changes and on 
the same cultural proclivities for modesty on the one hand or 
exhibitionism on the other.  
—Joel Brenner, former National Security Agency senior counsel 
 
One of the primary complaints by opponents of UAS is fear that the government 
will be conducting surveillance on Americans. In his book America the Vulnerable: 
Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Joel Brenner claims that “this isn’t a 
case of heavy-handed government surveillance. It’s a case of pervasive, light-handed 
surveillance by just about everybody, producing massive amounts of information that can 
be correlated with a few keystrokes or mouse clicks. Transparency has come to the 
intelligence business.”78 Moreover, intelligence is not limited to government; in fact, 
businesses may be the largest consumer of intelligence when it comes to knowing about 
their customers and competition.   
In 2006, the UK-based Surveillance Studies Network submitted “A Report on the 
Surveillance Society: For the Information Commissioner.”  In contrast to the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which hopes to prevent a surveillance society,79 the UK 
report begins by stating that “It is pointless to talk about surveillance society in the future 
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tense. In all the rich countries of the world everyday life is suffused with surveillance 
encounters, not merely from dawn to dusk but 24/7.”80   
Rather than expend effort attempting to retroactively address this state of 
surveillance, the report suggest that “we shift from self-protection of privacy to the 
accountability of data-handlers.”81  This pragmatic approach assumes that cultural norms 
are evolving toward transparency in all areas, as Zuckerman and Brenner claimed.  
The report notes that “technologies are at their most important when they become 
ubiquitous, taken for granted, and largely invisible.”82 If one accepts this position, then 
being “largely invisible” might also include the confidence derived from the knowledge 
that personal data that is well-protected against abuse and misuse.  
To address concerns in this area, the UK established the Information 
Commissioner’s Office as “The UK’s independent authority set up to uphold information 
rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for 
individuals.” The larger EU community has also adopted clear guidelines, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the European Union Data Retention 
Directive. In contrast, the U.S. has no similar structure or national guidelines, instead 
relying on a network of agency-based privacy offices, various laws that address aspects 
of the privacy issue, and corporate self-regulation, consistent with a laissez-faire 
tradition. 
B. TOWARD A POLICY OPTION TO PROTECT PRIVACY WHILE 
MAINTAINING TRANSPARENCY 
Over the past several decades the EU had enacted or proposed a number of laws 
to protect privacy in an age of increasingly sophisticated technology and global 
interconnectedness. Key policies are summarized in the following pages. 
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1. European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is frequently cited to 
emphasize the fundamental human right to privacy. Indeed, the first part of Article 8 
seems clear on this point, stating: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
However, the full explanation provides significant latitude for domestic 
surveillance, stating:   
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.83  
Within the full scope of Article 8, it is entirely conceivable that UAS could be 
used for public good, such as law enforcement or monitoring everything from critical 
infrastructure to agriculture to environmental issues. In short, UAS could be used for 
anything requiring an aerial picture of facilities, property or constituencies, especially 
where such monitoring falls into the “dull, dirty or dangerous” category, in which a 
human operator might be at risk. However, such latitude also requires considerable 
judgment on the part of those conducting this surveillance, as well as strong trust building 
efforts with stakeholders to ensure that the spirit of Article 8 is preserved. 
2. EU Directive 95 
EU Directive 95 establishes a consistent approach to data privacy for all EU 
member countries, primarily to promote the free flow of commerce where otherwise 
differing privacy laws might create obstructions. There is, however, a clear exception to 
the right to privacy where sound and images are recorded, “such as in cases of video 
surveillance…if it is carried out for the purposes of public security, defence (sic), 
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national security or in the course of State activities relating to the area of criminal law or 
of other activities which do not come within the scope of Community law.”84 
As Kirby noted, a key difference between the U.S. and the EU— and in particular, 
the U.K.—is that there is no single agency in the U.S. with the sole responsibility for 
overseeing privacy laws and developing codes of practice. In fact, in this area, the U.S. 
might be considered a bit of the Wild West, with few sheriffs and little protection from 
commercial interests that aggregate and sell personal information to third parties.   
3. Safe Harbor 
The Safe Harbor initiative was established in 2000 to provide U.S. companies 
with guidelines for handling personal data when conducting transactions with EU 
member nations, and to assure EU members of a minimum standard of security. While it 
is largely incumbent on the private sector participants to monitor and self-certify 
themselves, if they do breach the rules there are financial penalties as well as the threat of 
being excluded from the Safe Harbor initiative. 
4. 2012 Data Protection Reform 
In July 2012, the European Commission suggested the following key updates to 
the landmark 1995 Data Protection Directive85: 
 A single set of data protection rules valid across the EU, enforced by 
stronger national authorities, enabling companies and individuals to work 
with their own national representative, regardless of where in the EU the 
data issue might originate. 
 Increased responsibility and accountability for those processing personal 
data.   
 A ‘right to be forgotten’ to help people better manage data-protection risks 
online. When they no longer want their data to be processed and there are 
no legitimate grounds for retaining it, the data will be deleted.   
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C. ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS 
A number of organizations have provided suggested guidelines on protecting 
privacy as technology fosters increasingly high fidelity composites of individual lives. 
Among the organizations at the fore of the issue are Privacy International, a UK-based 
charity founded in 1990 and, in the U.S., the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC), based in Washington, DC. These and other advocacy organizations are watching 
with concern as private sector-driven technology converges with the introduction of UAS 
into domestic airspace.    
Although EU Directive 95 is primarily directed at business use of personal data, 
in July 2013, Privacy International introduced its own version focusing on government 
use: the “International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communication.86 These 13 principles cover everything from legitimacy of the 
surveillance effort to proportionality of surveillance benefits over user rights to 
safeguards against illegitimate access. This last piece is especially important in light of 
very weak cybersecurity safeguards commonly used by the private sector. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLYING EU AND UK GOOD 
PRACTICES IN THE U.S. 
Technology will continue to outpace privacy law, however, the EU and UK might 
offer a number of good lessons that could be applied in the U.S. 
Often developed with the consumer in mind, many EU guidelines strive to protect 
privacy in a global economy that relies heavily on the collection and transfer of data on 
individuals. At the same time, these laws also tend to provide wide latitude to 
government entities conducting surveillance and data collection in the interest of public 
safety, national security and similar public services. 
Of the various measures already put in place in the EU, the move toward greater 
accountability for those who are collecting data seems most likely to establish protections 
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where they can be enforced. However, to adopt this as a primary approach in the U.S., it 
would also require a concerted effort to engage privacy groups and the general public. 
This effort should be supported by a transparent government approach, including well 
publicized opportunities for public comment supported by an outreach and education 
campaign conducted by a partnership of government agencies, media partners and 
advocacy organizations.  
Other key components of EU laws include establishing a single national office to 
provide oversight and streamline coordination on privacy issues, as well as exemptions 
for critical life safety and protection of property issues, such as national or economic 
security. 
Of interest, advocacy groups like EPIC and the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) also favor a national guideline, rather than a state-by-state approach, stating, 
“National governments must put legal checks in place to prevent abuse of state powers, 
and international bodies need to consider how a changing technological environment 
shapes security agencies’ best practices.”87  
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VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS, ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
For those who have been following the UAS integration debate, 2015 looms like 
an event horizon, after which there is no turning back. Capable of carrying a wide variety 
of sensors, from highly sensitive cameras to thermal imaging equipment, UAS also offer 
flexibility of design and size limited only by imagination and the laws of physics.   
To some, this heralds the dawn of a new age in commercial enterprise and 
innovation that spans everything from emergency response to agriculture to 
environmental protection. However, without adequate privacy rules in place, others 
worry that 2015 will mark the end of privacy, as they envision tens of thousands of 
prying eyes in the sky.  
This final chapter will make an attempt to peer into the future, using several 
plausible scenarios to illustrate possible alternate futures based on current trends and 
technology, followed by a final analysis and recommendations. 
A. FUTURE SCENARIOS 2050 
This thesis presents an array of issues within the context of UAS and the national 
airspace. These included conceptual and tangible items, such as the increasingly rapid 
evolution of technology, the Internet of Things, autonomy, public opinion and 
cybersecurity. Drawing from these and other current phenomena, four potential future 
scenarios are explored briefly below. 
1. On the Sidelines 
Due to concerns over massive intelligence leaks by Edward Snowden and bad 
press stemming from U.S. military drone strikes overseas, the American public 
effectively halts plans to allow UAS into national airspace. Meanwhile, China, India, 
Israel, Australia, Japan, Canada and a host of other countries develop a multi-billion 
dollar global UAS industry. Drawn by the economic potential of overseas opportunities, 
Boeing all but stops investing in research and development on airplanes and focused its 
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efforts on the lucrative international UAS market. A diverse assortment of corporations 
that rely on air transport, such as UPS and other air cargo companies, are likewise finding 
more lucrative markets abroad, where they can take advantage of lower cost UAS. John 
Deere has set up an air division in Canada to sell agricultural UAS such as cropdusters, 
and many Hollywood cinemaphotography companies have relocated their operations to 
Bollywood. As a result of this cumulative exodus of investment and innovation, the U.S. 
loses its edge as a global economic force, and many wealthier families start sending their 
children overseas for their education, in hopes of better opportunities abroad. 
2. Government Leads the Way 
Disregarding the unease expressed by many Americans over news about 
government surveillance and military drone attacks overseas, the federal government 
focuses efforts on dealing with safety issues related to UAS integration and moves 
quickly to open up national airspace. Lacking balanced media coverage and clear 
information on how law enforcement, DHS and other agencies are collecting information, 
rumors spring up to fill in the gaps and spread like wildfire. The media feeds off rumors 
that the government is spying on its own population, seeking out “experts” to share their 
opinions on Fox News and other media outlets. Perception becomes reality, and people 
become increasingly frustrated and concerned. Finally, the government responds with an 
information campaign, but it is too late. The opportunity is lost and the public does not 
trust official sources. Extreme right wing groups and extreme left wing groups find 
common ground in their dismay over what they perceive to be an Orwellian trend. 
Opposition gathers momentum, and other issues like federal entitlement programs and 
taxes are thrown into the mix, fueling anger. Ultimately, a gaping divide opens between 
the government and its people. 
3. The Private Sector Leads the Way 
Stimulated by a heady mix of unlimited business opportunities and few 
regulations, large and small businesses and entrepreneurs vie for a place in the new 
economy. Feeding off of each other’s ideas, UAS applications evolve quickly. Now 
people in isolated communities can receive rapid medical support. Lost hikers and 
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Alzheimer’s patients can be quickly located and brought to safety—as can criminals. 
Budget-conscious communities can expand their emergency services capabilities with 
unmanned law enforcement, police and fire aircraft. New job markets open up to support 
ever more ingenious UAS applications. However, in the rush to break open new territory, 
massive amounts of data collected by UAS sensors are exposed through cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, and more and more people find their most intimate moments interrupted 
by a new breed of paparazzi that pursues the ordinary citizen for reality web shows. As 
UAS are linked into the Internet of Things, hackers find ways to divert UAS by smart 
phones. With no clear line of accountability, personal data succumbs to the Tragedy of 
the Commons, and privacy ceases to exist.  
4. A Coalition Forges a Balanced Path Forward 
Anticipating unlimited opportunities, but conscious of potential pitfalls, a 
coalition of government, corporate and advocacy leaders comes together to hash out a 
vision for how to leverage the benefits of UAS while maintaining security and privacy. 
Together, this group provides checks and balances to varying approaches and comes to a 
consensus that the goal of any policy should be that UAS technology works in support of 
the American people. The coalition develops clear guidance and accountability for 
privacy and security issues, while promoting a competitive environment that invites 
innovation. With this strong foundation, and supported by an aggressive outreach and 
education campaign, the American public feels more confident in the opportunities that 
await. Soon, UAS are as common and utilitarian as household appliances, bringing all of 
the benefits of a corporate-led integration along with the safety net of strong 
cybersecurity and privacy protections.  
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VII. ANALYSIS 
Introducing UAS into domestic airspace by 2015 is an ambitious plan, highly 
spiced with a peculiar mix of American individualism, massive defense industrial base 
money, politics, civil liberties interests, and intellectual curiosity. Developing a policy 
that achieves the intent of Congress’ mandate while retaining the less tangible and 
sometimes competing American values, like transparency and privacy, will require the 
active participation of a broad, bipartisan coalition of unlikely partners. 
The key issues discussed throughout this thesis are tightly interdependent, and 
should be addressed comprehensively. Privacy and economic interests depend on 
rigorous cybersecurity. Laws governing these issues not only must keep pace with 
technological advances, but must also peer into the future and address the unanticipated 
consequences. Policy must be developed through a transparent, public process, in which 
the media, advocacy groups, Congress, industry, academia, emergency responders and all 
of the other stakeholders are heard and their concerns considered. 
A successful policy can contribute to a new era in flight technology. Because of 
the extremely high degree of design flexibility, UAS could eventually support almost any 
type of airborne effort, from crop and pipeline monitoring to journalism to lower cost 
cargo transportation and mass medical support. An effective policy would also reflect a 
common vision of where the country wants to be, in terms of balancing individual 
liberties with economic benefits of developing a new domestic industry. In such a 
scenario the nation would fully harness technology to work “for” the population, and not 
against it. 
Lacking a strongly knit, well considered policy in the near future, an extreme 
“worst case” scenario could be a dystopian surveillance society in which privacy—and 
America as we know it—ceases to exist. Likewise, if we do not move forward quickly 
with UAS integration, we will lose any chance of global industry leadership in a 
nonlethal UAS (i.e., nonmilitarized) market, as other countries like Japan and Canada 
move forward. Another risk of ineffective policy is a bureaucratic maze of conflicting 
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laws at the federal, state and local levels, which make it impossible to leverage UAS 
technology or to become competitive in the budding domestic and global industry.  
A. COSTS 
Should the U.S. fail to move forward with integrating UAS domestically, the 
potential economic costs of lost business could be in the billions or tens of billions of 
dollars. 
However, the cost of developing and implementing a policy, in terms of tax payer 
dollars, should be relatively low. Costs to develop policy may be counted in terms of staff 
hours for government workers, and minimal costs to establish a menu of stakeholder 
engagement options, such as online and in person forums, as well as some travel costs for 
the program managers to visit different testing sites. 
At a state and local level, costs would include training for UAS pilots, especially 
in the first responder community. These costs are still less than the cost of training fixed 
and rotary wing pilots and buying equipment for manned aircraft, so there is a cost 
savings. To offset these and other costs, state governments might decide to offer tax 
incentives to promising UAS developers to base their operations in state. The indirect 
costs in tax dollars would be offset by jobs gained and tax revenues from the eventual 
sale of the unmanned systems.  
B. COURSES OF ACTION 
There really is no “status quo” on this emerging issue. However, if one were to 
point to something resembling status quo, it might be current military use of armed 
drones and unarmed surveillance UAS. Other options might include an aggressive plunge 
forward to meet congressional deadlines, or a negotiated integration in which UAS are 
integrated in phases, over a span of years.  
1. Maintain Status Quo 
To maintain status quo, the U.S. would keep its airspace closed to UAS and leave 
such use entirely to the military. The benefits of this course of action might include more 
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dedicated funding to military UAS research and development and avoiding disruption of 
domestic civil society as the public adapts to UAS at home. However, in this budget 
climate it seems unlikely that additional government funds would be available. It is also 
difficult at best to ignore a congressional mandate to open U.S. airspace. Furthermore, to 
ignore the potential for domestic use would put the U.S at a significant competitive 
disadvantage, as a wide array of allied nations and a number of nonallied nations are 
actively exploring or even using UAS at home.88  
2. Plunge Ahead 
An alternate course of action would be to adhere strictly to the word of the 
congressional guidance to open up airspace by 2015, and allow broad and immediate use 
of UAS. While this could offer immensely exciting opportunities to stakeholders ranging 
from law enforcement to private corporations, there is a significant potential downside of 
implementing this new technology without a supportive infrastructure of carefully 
considered guidance and matching air traffic control technology. All of the current 
issues- privacy, civil liberties and safety—would be compounded by bad publicity and 
lawsuits that would inevitably arise as UAS (especially smaller ones that would be more 
accessible to individual citizens) are put in the hands of untrained federal, state and local 
agencies or civilians. Bad press could work against the UAS industry, slowing down 
adaptation or even killing the effort altogether if there is enough public and congressional 
pushback, as in the case of the now-defunct DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
National Applications Office.89   
3. Phased Integration  
A third course of action would be phased integration over a span of several years. 
The FAA could focus its initial guidance on UAS use for public safety efforts like 
firefighting and meteorological monitoring, then expand quickly to law enforcement and 
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homeland security agencies support public safety and disaster response. (A 2003 public 
opinion survey by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics found that the 
general population would accept commercial and humanitarian use of UAS.90  
4. A Role for Standards 
In a related effort, standards organizations like the ANSI Homeland Security 
Standards Panel should develop consistent guidelines that will support interoperability of 
various UAS communications systems, as well as the adoption of UAS in a safe and 
publicly acceptable manner. Interoperable communications will increase safety efforts by 
enabling manned flights to communicate with UAS operators. It would also significantly 
increase joint law enforcement and homeland security efforts, allowing greater real-time 
information sharing, as encouraged in numerous strategies, including Vision 2015: A 
Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise.  
While these two efforts are working on guidance, the public will become 
accustomed to low-altitude “toy” UAS such as Verizon’s “Parrot” quadcopter that can be 
controlled through a mobile device. From such commercially use, it is a relatively small 
step for public acceptance of much broader market uses. An optimal situation would one 
in which a market demand is created for UAS, whether in government or public use. A 
strong marketing campaign that publicizes success stories would greatly increase this 
pull. 
Homeland security and law enforcement agencies have already started working 
toward UAS integration either in pilot projects or through research and training. 
Moreover, government officials are not driven by market decisions and are more risk 
averse, thus increasing the likelihood of successful integration. Open market use can be 
phased in at a slower rate, based on lessons learned through the government use, and a 
corresponding publicity campaign demonstrating the benefits of public use. Policy 
makers should also review the suggested guidance already developed by the lead industry 
and public advocacy voices on this issue, including the American Civil Liberties Union 
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(ACLU), the Human Rights Watch and The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International (AUVSI). 
The UAS industry is poised to drive the U.S. into a new era of public and private 
aviation. Usage has the potential to span just about every aspect of domestic society. 
With a practical, common sense approach, the public and private sectors can work 
together to make UAS a widely used and appreciated tool, as well as an economic 
advantage.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. has a complex relationship with the issue of privacy. Given the privacy 
concerns being raised over the integration of UAS into domestic airspace, the federal 
government should be proactive in establishing clear guidelines. One way to do this is to 
look to allies that have already accumulated experience with similar issues and adopt 
promising practices, such as those listed earlier. A final consideration is that U.S. 
business interests may lobby hard against new regulations of any sort, so an alternate 
approach would be to expand the Safe Harbor Initiative nationwide, as a way to phase in 
stronger privacy legislation later.  
The following policy recommendations expanding on the principles of “safety, 
professionalism and respect” espoused by AUVSI, and synthesize recommendations from 
civil liberties advocates, international good practices and common marketing principles,91 
as well as some of the author’s own thoughts.  
1. Establish Boundaries  
There is discussion in the online community revolving around “not over my back 
yard” opposition to UAS. Steps that could ease these concerns might include: 
 Establish “no fly” zones around communities, with exceptions for law 
enforcement, emergency services and licensed carriers (e.g., cargo 
transport) 
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 Develop UAS “airways” (similar to current roadmaps and highways for 
land and channel markers for maritime traffic) so the majority of UAS 
traffic flows along established routes 
 Expand personal property boundaries vertically, to cover the airspace over 
homes, up to 400 feet (the current standard for small UAS like 
quadcopters) 
2. Accountability through Identification 
Every person who drives a motorized vehicle is required to be qualified and 
accountable. Typically, this is through licensing and training. Drawing on current practice 
for land-based vehicles, the following practices could alleviate privacy concerns by 
increasing accountability: 
 Establish a UAS version of the Department of Motor Vehicles, with 
mandates similar to car drivers: licenses, registration, license plate- all to 
create accountability 
 Clearly mark police and emergency services UAS, similar to vehicle 
markings 
3. Engage Stakeholders 
Messaging used in outreach by policy makers, industry and the media should 
make every effort to frame the coverage of UAS in a way that brings humanity back into 
the picture and reaffirms that technology works for the American public, never against. 
Currently, a handful of police departments around the country are attempting to expand 
their capability with UAS. However, community backlash has threatened to shut down 
some of these operations before they have taken flight. Some communities, like 
Charlottesville, VA, prohibited UAS before the local law enforcement even considered 
their use. Early, continual stakeholder engagement is key to the success of controversial 
efforts like the use of UAS. Some recommendations include:  
 Work closely with the ACLU and other opponents to develop common-
sense guidelines 
 Let communities vote on whether they want local law enforcement to use 
UAS, and to what extent 
 Let the market drive demand. Rather than government driving usage, let 
commercial interests drive demand for UAS by demonstrating value (e.g., 
cargo transport, commercial and private security, etc.) 
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 Conduct a public outreach campaign to test public opinion and introduce 
the concept of UAS and the benefits they can bring 
 Demystify UAS with “show and tell” events, similar to what emergency 
services do already; allow people to touch and see UAS, and perhaps even 
publicly demo them in a controlled environment 
4. Employ only NonLethal Payloads in National Airspace 
Fully autonomous UAS are already in development. To avoid a highly 
undesirable direction in the future, UAS used for routine homeland security or law 
enforcement activities should not carry lethal payloads in domestic airspace.  
5. Adapt Current Surveillance Laws to Unmanned Aircraft  
Government entities should adhere to current laws related to warrants, wiretaps 
and other surveillance guidance, as well as current guidance related to law enforcement 
use of airplanes and helicopters. 
6. Develop a Single, National Privacy Standard 
Airspace rules transcend boundaries, in keeping with the nature of the airspace 
itself. Likewise, privacy laws applied to UAS should be consistent nationwide to allow 
for free flow of commerce and homeland security coordination among federal, state and 
local entities. This law would govern the legitimate collection, aggregation and disposal 
of personal data through aerial surveillance, whether for commercial or government 
purposes.  
7. Establish a Federal Office in Charge of Monitoring Data Privacy, 
with State-Based Field Offices   
At present, no single office is in charge of privacy, making oversight more 
complex than necessary. A single, national office will reduce bureaucracy and streamline 
processes related to collecting, aggregating and disposing of data. It would also provide 
citizens with a single point of contact for accessing, correcting or petitioning for disposal 
of personal data. 
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8. Enforce Accountability of Data Collectors 
Making the data collectors accountable for the integrity, security and proper 
disposal of data collected by UAS is the most effective way to ensure that data will be 
handled appropriately. UAS operators will be responsible for ensuring that streaming 
images and sound is protected against illegal access by encryption or other means. 
9. Provide Limited Exemptions for Activities Conducted in the Interest 
of National Security, Life Safety, and Protection of Property 
These are the most consistent exceptions found in the EU and UK laws, and 
should apply equally in the U.S. However, such exceptions should be made judiciously 
and in keeping with existing U.S. laws government warrants, search and seizure and other 
civil rights.  
10. Manage Risk and Enforce Cybersecurity from the Inside Out 
 Cybersecurity is still on the periphery of most people’s awareness. Yet, as 
Brenner writes, leaders must  “accept that their information systems are compromised 
and must plan accordingly.”92 Risk and responsibility for risk must be assigned 
definitively for each step along the UAS supply chain, from designer to end user. Brenner 
advises companies to control what and who is on their systems, protect information of 
value, patch networks, train staff, audit and manage overseas travel behavior.93 In the 
case of UAS, this could mean tighter controls over the manufacturing process, enhanced 
security screening for employees with access to any part of the research, development 
and manufacturing process, stricter enforcement of basic computer hygiene by all 
company employees, and better funding and increased authority for the department 
responsible for corporate security.  
D. MEASURING SUCCESS 
If media can be assumed to reflect the voice of the concerned—through its 
traditional role of encouraging transparency and public debate—then one measure of 
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success would be positive or neutral media coverage of UAS, including a growing 
differentiation between armed military drones and the types of UAS more likely to be 
used commonly in the U.S. 
Another indicator of success could be measured in the quality and quantity of 
stakeholder feedback collected from representative segments of all major impacted 
groups (i.e., intergovernmental partners, first responders, general public, civil liberties 
groups, business and industry) as policies are developed. Stakeholders should continue to 
be engaged as policies are implemented.  
A long term measurement could start with the rollout of a national policy 
governing domestic UAS. Positive or neutral media coverage would continue to be a 
good measure, as would minimal stakeholder backlash. The latter would indicate that 
policy makers had effectively addressed key stakeholder concerns and maintained an 
active public engagement campaign throughout the process to ensure transparency. 
Public opinion polls could capture a more scientifically accurate measure of acceptance 
of domestic UAS. 
Ultimately, an effective policy would support U.S. industry and facilitate a move 
to global leadership in production of domestic/nonmilitary UAS, while UAS technology 
enhances the quality of life in the U.S. 
E. CONCLUSION  
As we stand on the precipice of a new era, we still have choices. Will the U.S. 
take a step back, preserving what it knows and withdrawing from a global technology 
revolution? Or will we take a leap of faith, spreading our wings and soaring into the 
unknown?  
What do we stand to lose? If we opt to maintain status quo—in other words, an 
America where UAS are not part of the common experience—then the American 
economy could lose its opportunity to leverage an emerging, multibillion dollar global 
industry. The nation could also lose the opportunity to leverage this technology to 
improve lives.  
72 
For pessimists, a worst case scenario might be one in which government entities 
use UAS for pervasive, persistent mass surveillance, monitoring everyone, all the time. In 
such a scenario, privacy would become meaningless. Fully autonomous—and eventually, 
perhaps even self-aware—UAS would be linked into the Internet of Things, able to 
connect with your credit cards, smart phones, bank account, car, iPad—anything with a 
digital signal—tracking individuals regardless of their criminal intent and generally 
stifling free expression.  
In an optimal scenario, the country would benefit from UAS that bring medical 
treatment to people who live in remote locations or fly in swarms to provide mass 
vaccinations during pandemics. They would monitor thousands of miles of pipelines and 
provide temporary communications support after disasters. Lost hikers or escaped 
convicts could be found quickly and chemical hazards could be monitored with greater 
transparency and attribution. At the same time, people would know that any data 
collected is handled, stored and disposed of securely, and that an individual may access 
and correct information on themselves with minimal bureaucracy. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Swirling around in the not-too-distant future are the progeny of today’s ideas—
autonomy, self-aware robotics, 3-D printing, organic machinery….all of these and more 
will influence the future of UAS. This thesis merely scratched the surface of the most 
immediate issues facing the nation as UAS are introduced into national airspace. The 
implication of other technology under development and their convergence with UAS 
opens up virtually unlimited areas of exploration.  
What will happen when autonomous UAS become self-aware? Could they 
diagnose and repair their own mechanical failures, thus improving safety? How might 3-
D printing challenge efforts to institute accountability, or the ability of law enforcement 
to track anonymous and illegitimate UAS?  The cyber security aspects alone could 
comprise the sole focus of another thesis.  
We are Da Vinci’s children. We are creating the machinery and the ideas that can 
launch us into destruction or Renaissance. As such, we face challenges similar to those of 
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the great engineer/inventor/artist Leonardo da Vinci, many of whose ideas for disruptive 
innovations were hundreds of years ahead of their time.  
Whether one believes that today’s population is better prepared to adapt, having 
been primed by a world that is already technologically advanced, or that technology is 
advancing too fast to keep up, the policies we put in place and decisions taken today will 
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APPENDIX A.  USEFUL LINKS 
 Certificate of Waiver and Authorization Online Resources: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_unit
s/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/  
 FAA Frequently Asked Questions about UAS: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/uas_faq/  





 Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus: 
http://unmannedsystemscaucus.mckeon.house.gov/  
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